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1. Introduction  
 
The diploma thesis at hand revaluates the influence of speculation on 
commodity prices dynamics between 2003 and 2009. 
The author obtained the image of elaborating a study on this topic during an 
internship in Mexico in 2008. Similar to developing countries, the large 
number of poor people in Mexico was strongly affected by the increases of 
agricultural commodity prices. The dynamics of the latter not only caused food 
insecurity of millions, but also affected political stability. It was the strong 
effects of commodity prices on global economies and political stability that 
aroused the author’s interest in this field, in particular in the question whether 
prices between 2003 and 2009 fully reflected their “true” fundamental value or 
whether they were distorted by destabilizing speculation.  
 
The commodity bull market between 2003 and mid 2008 was the most 
pronounced in decades, not only in its length but also in its magnitude. Prices 
of nearly every important agricultural and energy commodity increased 
considerably. The IMF commodity price index nearly quadrupled over little 
more than five years (http://www.imf.org).  
A comprehensive reconsideration of those dynamics is of great contemporary 
importance for several reasons.  
First, especially crude oil has constituted a major input factor for large parts of 
industries. The strong crude oil bull market between 2003 and mid 2008 
therefore boosted production costs considerably. Especially when the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis became apparent, the high price of 
crude oil not only deteriorated expectations, but also more importantly directly 
decelerated economic growth. 
Second, price hikes of major agricultural commodities (especially wheat, corn 
and rice) had a great impact on net food importing developing countries. The 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimated a 
record high of over one billion undernourished people worldwide in 2009 (FAO 
2009). As a result, food riots broke off in several developing countries.  
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The rising food and energy inflation also affected overall consumption in 
industrialized countries since a larger proportion of income had to be spent on 
food, heating etc. Last but not least, rising commodity prices accelerated he 
increase of overall inflation and thereby constricted the monetary policy of 
central banks (Schulmeister 2009).  
 
The purpose and central question of the study is to analyse whether recent 
price hikes can be explained without destabilizing speculation in commodity 
futures markets. Academic economists and practitioners have still not reached 
a consensus regarding the question whether speculation has (at least partly) 
caused price increases. For decades the discourse on the formation of 
commodity prices has been shaped by the predominant belief in the efficiency 
of commodity spot and futures markets. Recent price dynamics, however, 
challenged this position and call for a comprehensive reconsideration of 
commodity price dynamics in the 21st century.  
This study shall try to contribute to the discourse on commodity price 
formation by opposing the efficiency hypothesis to a speculation hypothesis. 
 
In chapter 2 the analysis begins with an overview of relevant theoretical 
aspects. The main problem with commodity price theory is the lack of useful 
models as to the recent price dynamics. The emphasis of this paper’s 
theoretical part is therefore placed on modelling different perceptions of 
financial markets, rather than on elaborating one testable model. Predictions 
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) will be opposed to predictions of 
inefficient market positions. This shall advocate a better understanding of the 
dependence of the efficiency hypothesis on assumptions that might not hold 
in real commodity futures markets.    
Chapter 3 analyses the empirical behaviour of the prices of copper, corn, 
crude oil, gold and wheat after 2003. The aim of this part is to empirically 
evaluate the propositions presented in chapter 2, i.e. whether the efficiency- 
or the speculation hypothesis is more suitable to describe commodity price 
dynamics in the 21st century. Several aspects will be discussed, whereby the 
approach will be from general to specific.   
Chapter 4 finally concludes this study. 
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2. Theoretical Aspects of Commodity Price Formation 
 
2.1. Hotelling’s Rule1 
 
In his classic text The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, Harold Hotelling 
formulated the fundamental principle underlying the economics of natural 
resources (Solow 1974). Although the paper was written back in 1931, 
already at that time the author dedicated himself to the question of the optimal 
depletion of commodities. Although his paper deals with exhaustible 
resources, certain deductions are equally valid for agricultural commodities 
such as wheat and corn, as they are also storable to a certain extent.2  
An inventory of a commodity, be it stored in a stash or underground, can be 
regarded as a capital asset for its owner (Solow 1974: 2). The possibility of 
storage provides producers with two options, either to sell the product or to 
postpone (part of) its sales to a future period and keep underground 
inventories. The first step of Hotelling was to detect the determinants of the 
decision between selling and holding (Hotelling 1931: 140). 
Assume that producers of commodities want to maximize the present value of 
their future profits.  
A producer will be indifferent between receiving a net price p
0
 now and a 
price p
0
e
! t  at time t , if the net price p
0
 of the commodity increases over time 
at a rate equal to the interest rate factor ! 3. Under perfect competition the net 
price denotes the market price of the good minus marginal extraction costs.  
Inventories left underground can only produce a return for their owner, if the 
net price is increasing over time. The market can therefore only be in 
equilibrium if net price and interest factor are growing at the same rate. If the 
net price increased too slowly, then producers would augment their supply of 
the good, as the rate of interest would yield a higher utility than underground 
storage or even a constant remaining supply. If on the other hand the net 
                                                
1 All mathematical expressions in this chapter were obtained from Hotelling (1931). 
2 One would have to adjust calculations to the costs of storing a commodity in a stash 
rather than underground.  
3 Note that this applies only to perfectly competitive markets. 
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price increased at a rate greater than the rate of interest, producers would 
have incentives to cut back on supply and increase underground storage. 
This simple statement determines the condition for market efficiency and as 
Robert Solow called it, constitutes the fundamental principle of the economics 
of exhaustible resources (Solow 1974: 3).  
Within the discussion about rising oil prices between 2007 and mid 2008, an 
argument was brought up that was based on exactly the above- described 
logic. Media often reported that one of the reasons for the strong oil price 
increases was the cutback of supply by the OPEC. The incentives to reduce 
their supply of oil resulted from the strong price increases, at a higher rate 
than the growth rate of the interest rate factor. However, we will see later on 
that this should theoretically not be possible. 
The condition for the market to be in equilibrium under perfect competition at 
any point in time is therefore that p
t
= p
0
e
! t , with p
0
 determined by supply and 
demand conditions at that time. Let the supply of the commodity be denoted 
by a  and the demand by qt = f (pt ,t) . As it is the condition for the market to 
be in equilibrium, the net price grows at an equal rate as the rate of the 
interest factor.  
Therefore we obtain the following expression:  
 q
0
T
! dt = f (p0e
" t
,t)dt
0
T
! = a
4 
 
Since we are discussing exhaustible resources, the upper limit T denotes the 
time when the resource will finally be exhausted and demand will be zero.  
Assume furthermore that demand is diminishing in the price and the demand 
function has a unique solution at any point in time. 
Suppose, for example, that the demand function is given by q = 5 ! p , 
independent of the time. Then, if the price of the resource is equal to or higher 
than five, demand will be zero. With demand approaching zero, the price will 
increase to the value of five, which is the highest price any consumer in the 
market would pay. Therefore the condition at time T  will be that p
0
e
!T
= 5  and 
supply and demand will be  
                                                
4 The price consumers face does include extraction costs. 
 5 
 a = (5 ! p0e
" t
)dt = 5T ! p0 (e
"T !1) / "
0
T
#  
After eliminating p
o
Hotelling obtained the following result: 
 e!"T = 1+ " (a / 5 ! T )  
If this equation is plotted as a function of T , an exponential curve will be 
obtained.  
What has just been described formally are the effects of the resource being 
exhaustible. At some point in time, the commodity will become significantly 
scarce and the market price for the commodity will have to rise steeply. This 
will be due to an increase in the net price, which Solow called the scarcity rent 
(Solow 1973: 3). However, it can also be that extraction costs increase with 
the advancing depletion of the resource.  
Due to the increasing market price, demand will accordingly fall, until at some 
point (time T ) the market price will be sufficiently high to cut off demand 
entirely. In this moment, if producers behaved rationally over time, the 
resource would be exhausted (Hotelling 1931). 
The logic of prices increasing due to the advanced depletion of the resource 
takes an important place in the fundamental valuation of commodities. The 
accelerating depletion of existing oil fields and the rising costs of discovering 
new oil resources, denoted as peak oil, constitute major fundamental factors 
that influence prices (Soros 2008: 2). Furthermore, they strengthen optimistic 
expectations of (strongly) rising future prices.  
However, the concept of backstop technology could provide a ceiling for the 
price increases of exhaustible resources (Solow 1974: 4). 
This term denotes a technology capable of substituting an exhaustible 
resource by another (abundant) technology, however, at high costs. As the 
depletion of (underground) stocks of an exhaustible resource advances, the 
scarcity rent will increase exponentially until at some point the market price 
will exceed the costs of the backstop technology. Although this concept might 
become essentially important for some commodities such as crude oil, it is not 
of major importance for this paper’s topic.  
Let us return to Hotelling’s fundamental principle, which is the equilibrium 
condition between net prices and the rate of interest. According to Robert 
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Solow, the flow markets of the commodities could easily become unstable 
(Solow 1974: 6). If net prices were considered to rise too fast compared to the 
rate of interest, producers would increase their underground inventories and 
cut back supply.  
In accordance to demand exceeding supply, the market price of the good 
would increase. This would then strengthen the optimistic beliefs of 
producers, which in the end could lead to a self-reinforcing speculative run-up 
of prices.  
However, the knowledge of the existence of a long run equilibrium value of 
the good would correct the disequilibrium in the flow market. If net prices 
increased at a rate considered too high, this would not lead to a strong 
cutback of supply but rather to a revaluation of existing stocks of the good 
(Solow 1974: 6).  
 
The discussion of the fundamental principle of the economics of exhaustible 
resources was rather perfunctory. However, already after taking a quick look 
at the arguments proposed by Harold Hotelling and Robert Solow, it becomes 
clear that the equilibrium conditions in commodity flow markets cannot be 
analysed segregated from other financial and macroeconomic factors. In 
order to fully understand spot price dynamics, also the conditions of other 
financial markets, most importantly commodity futures markets, have to be 
taken into consideration.  
For that reason the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) will be discussed in a 
next step. It constitutes the fundament of the belief in efficiently functioning 
financial markets (as commodity futures markets). 
 
 
2.2. The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The theoretical benchmark model of the efficiency hypothesis builds up very 
strongly on the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), as formulated by Eugene 
Fama in 1970. 
Fama defines a financial market as efficient, if security prices always fully 
reflect all available information (Fama 1970: 383).  
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Stating that real world financial markets, such as commodity futures markets, 
are efficient according to the before mentioned definition, the EMH rules out 
the possibility of trading systems based only on currently available information 
that have expected returns in excess of equilibrium return (Shleifer 2000).  
 
According to the EMH, market participants are assumed to be rational and 
they therefore value securities rationally, based on their fundamental values.   
Notational, an efficient market can be described as follows: 
Assume that all events take place at discrete points in time, t !1,  t,  t +1  etc.  
The term !
t"1  denotes the information set available at time t !1, which is 
relevant for determining security prices at time t !1.  
!
t"1
m  is the set of information the market uses at time t !1 to determine 
security prices. Thus !
t"1
m  is a subset of !
t"1  and contains at most the 
information !
t"1 , however, it could also contain less. 
The price of a security j  at a discrete point in time is denoted by p
j ,t+!
, with 
j = 1,2,...,n , where n  is the number of securities available in the market. 
The joint probability density function for security prices at time t + !  ! " 0( )  
assessed by the market at time t !1, conditionally on the information set !
t"1
m  
is denoted by f m (p1,t+! ,..., pn,t+! "
m
t#1) . 
The “true” joint probability density function that follows from the information 
set !
t"1  equals f (p1,t+! ,..., pn,t+! "t#1) . 
 
The set of information !
t"1  can be described as the state of the world at time 
t !1, as it includes current and past values of relevant variables like 
consumer tastes or the political climate in general (Fama 1976). 
Additionally, the above- described information set also includes whatever is 
known about the evolution of the state of the world throughout time (Fama 
1976).  
The process of price formation at time t !1 then happens as follows.  
Based on the information used in the market at time t !1, !
t"1
m , market 
participants assess a joint distribution of security prices for the next period ( t ) 
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f
m
(p
1,t ,..., pn,t !t"1
m
) . Following this distribution, current security prices 
p
1,t!1
,..., p
n,t!1
 are then determined by the market, based on a model of market 
equilibrium which defines equilibrium prices according to the characteristics of 
the joint distribution of prices (Fama 1976: 135).  
As common in economics, the term “market equilibrium” implies a set of 
market-clearing prices, at which demand for securities meets supply.  
The main point of this notation, that a capital market is efficient, is then stated 
as follows:  
 !
t"1
m
= !
t"1  (2.1) 
This indicates that the information market participants use to determine 
security prices at time t !1 includes all available information at that point in 
time.  
Since !
t"1 includes everything that is known about the evolution of the state of 
the world throughout time, equation (2.1) implies: 
 f m (p1,t ,..., pn,t ! t"1
m
) = f (p
1,t ,..., pn,t !t"1)  (2.2)  
Because current prices are determined on the basis of the joint density 
function, they fully reflect all available information at time t !1 (Fama 1976). 
This simple statement that prices reflect all information and markets are 
therefore efficient already implicates crucial assumptions. Fama stated that 
equilibrium prices are determined by market participants based on one “true” 
model of market equilibrium. However, why should all traders in the market 
assume the same equilibrium model? Whether market prices really reflect 
their fundamental values, this crucially depends on the assumptions of market 
participants what the equilibrium values really are. An infinite number of these 
models used by traders might exist and furthermore not all of them 
necessarily have to be based on the information set !
t"1
m .  
Fama additionally assumed that !
t"1
m  includes all information from the past up 
to the present. Loosely speaking, traders do their job rationally and are well 
informed (equipped with perfect knowledge) about the past. However, the 
important question arises why the future should continue the past! Behind that 
proposition there is the assumption of one single probability system governing 
prices. It is constant over time and therefore does not change even if prices 
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exhibit high variances. John Maynard Keynes denotes the assumption of one 
probability system as a convention, however, one based on weak grounds 
(Keynes 1967: 152). Keynes will be discussed in more detail later on.  
To be able to make the model empirically testable, however, the term “fully 
reflect” must be defined. Many empirical models state the conditions of 
financial market equilibrium in terms of expected returns. Conditional on the 
relevant information set, the equilibrium return on a security is a function of its 
risk.  
The outcome of the model strongly depends on the defined relationship 
between risk and return. However, the above described “strong” version of the 
Market Efficiency Hypothesis can only serve as a benchmark for the efficiency 
hypothesis, as it implies that information and trading costs are zero 
(Grossman and Stiglitz 1980).  
 
The model underlying the commodity efficiency hypothesis obviously relaxes 
the (unrealistic) assumptions of zero trading- and information costs. However, 
it is still closely related to the main propositions of the EMH, although to a 
more “sensitively” formulated version, stating that earning above equilibrium 
returns is not possible without accepting above average risk (Malkiel 2003: 
59). 
Market participants are again assumed to act fully rationally and use the same 
information set to form their beliefs, however, they do not know the 
expectations of the other actors (Schulmeister 2009). 
Investors are fully rational, that means that they value each security for their 
fundamental value, i.e. the net present values of their future cash flows, 
discounted by their risk characteristics. 
When new information arrives, investors in the market quickly respond to this 
information by bidding prices up if the news arrived is good, or by bidding 
them down if the news suggests prices to fall.  
As this new information is incorporated into prices, they adjust quickly to their 
new levels corresponding to their fundamental values.  
In contrast to the strong version of the EMH discussed before, prices do not 
jump immediately to a new equilibrium, but reach it through a gradual price 
discovery process.  
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If all actors are rational, a financial market is efficient by definition. However, 
efficiency does not live or die with the rationality of all actors. Assume that 
irrational investors trade randomly in the market. If their trading strategies are 
not correlated, their trades are likely to cancel each other as not all irrational 
traders share the same expectations. Therefore, prices will still be close to 
their fundamental values, although the trading volume will increase (Shleifer 
2000). 
Surprisingly, a market can be considered efficient even if irrational actors’ 
trading strategies are correlated. This case is based on the argument of 
arbitrage and is, according to Andrei Shleifer “(…), one of the most intuitively 
appealing and plausible arguments in all of economics” (Shleifer 2000: 3). 
Arbitrage defines the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same, or 
essentially similar security in two different markets at advantageously different 
prices (Alexander and Sharpe 1990). 
Assume, due to correlated trading strategies of irrational actors, the price of a 
security overshoots its fundamental value and exceeds the properly risk 
adjusted net present value of future cash flows. 
Observing this, a rational investor will sell (short) this security in the market 
and simultaneously buy (go long on) an adequate substitute to hedge his risk. 
By doing so, the rational investor is able to earn a return above the equilibrium 
return. 
If arbitrage happens quickly enough, sufficient adequate substitutes are 
available and rational actors are competing to earn the above equilibrium 
profits, security prices will not deviate much from their fundamental values 
and arbitrageurs will not be able to earn much of abnormal returns (Shleifer 
2000). 
Additionally to bringing prices back in line with their fundamental values, 
arbitrage will also result in irrational investors losing money. They will become 
less wealthy and eventually disappear from the market. 
In the long run, market efficiency will not only be achieved by arbitrage, but 
also by competitive selection (Shleifer 2000). 
The empirical consequences of rational markets (the term “market” of course 
used as a metaphor to summarize the decisions made by individuals) are 
remarkable. 
 11 
First, it somehow eases the argument that high transaction volumes indicate 
inefficient markets. As mentioned before, irrational trades can either be 
uncorrelated or compensated by arbitrage. Both cases will lead to an increase 
in the transaction volume in a market; however, prices will stay in line with 
their fundamental values.  
Second, and even more important, rational behaviour and arbitrage rule out 
the possibility of an endogenous overshooting (in both directions) of prices 
due to excessive speculation in the market. 
Speculation on securities provides the market with the necessary liquidity and 
is, according to the EMH and the commodity efficiency hypothesis, an 
essential part of the price discovery process. Arbitrage even smoothens 
prices towards their fundamental equilibrium values.  
As a consequence, any (long run) deviation of prices from their fundamental 
equilibrium values must be attributed to exogenous shocks and cannot be 
caused by excessive speculation. 
 
 
2.3 The Random Walk Hypothesis 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis is often linked with the idea of asset price 
changes following a Random Walk without drift.  
In this context, the term “Random Walk” denotes a series of security prices, 
where all subsequent prices departure randomly from previous prices (Fama 
1970, Malkiel 2003). 
The first Scientist to formulate the idea that equity prices follow a stochastic 
process was Louis Bachelier (a French mathematician) in 1900. 
In his doctoral thesis “Théorie de la Speculation” he elaborated the train of 
thought, that for each price, there exists a buyer and a seller, whose 
expectations about future price developments diverge. While the buyer 
expects future prices to further increase, the seller expects them to fall. In 
total, as Bachelier deduced, the anticipations of all market participants even 
out. Therefore their expected value equals zero and asset prices are not 
predictable (Fama 1970: 389).  
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Formally a Random Walk without drift can be described as: 
X
t
= X
t!1
+ "
t
 with 
 
!
t
! iid  (0,"
2
)  
Since the expected value of the error term equals zero, it follows that: 
E(X
t
) = X
t!1
 
Prices will follow a Random Walk if the price changes are independently and 
identically distributed. This means daily commodity prices are independent 
over time. 
Assume that the conditions of market equilibrium can be stated in terms of 
expected values and all available information on fundamental values is 
incorporated into prices. 
Then one can define the excess market value of a security j  at time t +1 as: 
x
j ,t+1
= p
j ,t+1
! E(p
j ,t+1
"
t
)  
The excess value equals the difference between the observed price of 
security j  at time t +1 and the expected price at t +1, conditional on the 
available information at time t . 
Then 
 
E( !x
j ,t+1
!
t
) = 0  
The tildes indicate that x j ,t+1 is a random variable at time t . 
Let !("
t
) = !
1
("
t
),...,!
n
("
t
)[ ]  be a trading system based on the information 
available at time t , which suggests the investment of a certain amount on 
each of the n  securities. The total excess market value at time t +1 is then 
determined by 
 
V
t+1
= !
j
("
t
)
j=1
n
# pj ,t+1 $ E( !pj ,t+1 "t%& '(  
Since 
 
p
j ,t+1
! E( !p
j ,t+1
"
t
) = 0 , it follows that 
 
E( !V
t+1
!
t
) = "
j
(!
t
)E( !x
j ,t+1
j=1
n
# !t ) = 0  
The logic of this idea, which underlies the efficiency hypothesis, suggests that 
the emergence of news and exogenous shocks follow a Random Walk. 
If new information is nearly immediately reflected in security prices, then price 
changes in the next period will only reflect the news (changes in the 
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fundamental values) of the next period and will be independent of the news of 
the current period.  
Prices will therefore be independently distributed. Since new information and 
shocks are by definition not predictable, also future price changes are 
unpredictable and therefore random (Fama 1970). 
 
The implications of the statement that security prices follow a Random Walk 
are striking, as they rule out the systematic profitability of trading strategies 
only based on past prices (and information).  
The statement therefore postulates that no investor, be it a hedge fond or an 
individual amateur, can consistently beat the market, neither by technical 
analysis (the study of past prices) nor by fundamental analysis (the study of 
financial information) (Shleifer 2000).5 This is due to prices being independent 
over time and only responding to random shocks, which by definition cannot 
be forecasted.  
Regarding empirical studies, however, measuring the profitability of trading 
strategies is still very controversial. 
To test whether it is possible to earn above equilibrium profits, a researcher 
has to define a reasonable relationship between the returns that can be 
earned and risk. 
A considerable amount of studies found “money making” opportunities in 
financial markets, they therefore contradict the EMH. However, whenever 
money making opportunities, based on past prices and (also current) 
information were found, the opposition did not take long to formulate a model 
of risk, reducing above equilibrium profits to a fair compensation for the risk 
born by investors (Shleifer 2003). 
The relationship between risk and returns could therefore be seen as the very 
controversial part in measuring the efficiency of a financial market. 
One broadly accepted concept is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), as 
formulated by Sharpe (1964). 
                                                
5 Beat the market in the sense of earning above equilibrium returns. 
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To summarize the empirical predictions of the efficiency hypothesis, financial 
markets (rational individuals) are expected to incorporate new information on 
fundamental values of securities both quickly and correctly (Shleifer 2000). 
Although prices will not jump immediately to their new equilibrium value, they 
should follow a gradual discovery process, so that investors discovering the 
news too late should not be able to profit from it (or even lose). 
Also rational individuals should incorporate new information adequately. 
Prices should neither over- nor under react to new information, nor should 
they follow a particular trend. 
Due to this behaviour, market participants should not be able to earn above 
equilibrium returns when they base their strategies on past information. 
 
 
2.4. Theoretical Challenges of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The position of inefficient markets seizes on trading behaviour and price 
dynamics in financial markets considerably different from the efficiency 
hypothesis. 
It is the central theoretical assumptions in which the two hypotheses vary in, 
and which lead to the different empirical views of the characteristics of real 
world financial markets, as in this case commodity futures markets.  
 
To begin with, the first difference regards an assumption every 
(under)graduate student of economics is taught to use in order to capture the 
rational, utility maximizing behaviour of economic agents - the rational 
behaviour of the “homo oeconomicus”. 
It is exactly the rational behaviour of economic agents in financial market, 
which the inefficiency hypothesis challenges. 
According to the latter, an actor’s conduct is not only governed by rational 
calculations, but also by emotional and social factors. Also for that reason, 
financial markets themselves are often characterized as in a manic or 
depressive phase (Keynes 1936, Schulmeister 2009). 
While the efficiency hypothesis assumes that only relevant information is used 
by market participants to form their price expectations (and demand), others 
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argue that investors also react to irrelevant information and are not equipped 
with full knowledge.   
Trading based on irrelevant rather than relevant information, and therefore not 
rational according to the normative model is called noise trading (Shleifer 
2000: 12). 
The deviation of economic agents away from the standard decision making 
model, however, takes place in a number of areas.  
First, in assessing risky speculations, not all individuals follow the maxims of 
the von Neumann-Morgenstern rationality (Kahneman and Riepe 1998, 
Shleifer 2000). While a perfectly rational decision maker should consider the 
amount of final wealth that can be obtained, many actors rather account for 
the gains and losses along the way. 
Investors also tend to show a strong loss aversion, which means that the 
function for losses is steeper than the function for gains (Kahneman and 
Riepe 1998).  
Consider for example the manager of an investment fund, who gets evaluated 
on a regular basis. In order to look good and justify his own position, the 
manager might have incentives to add stocks to his portfolio that have 
recently done well, and sell stocks that have recently done rather poorly.  
Individuals also violate maxims of probability theory, as Bayes law, when they 
assess the outcomes of uncertain events.  
For example, as in technical trading systems, speculators often try to predict 
future price movements by analyzing price dynamics in the recent past.  
By doing so, investors might perceive patterns that do not exist, and therefore 
generate an incorrect model. The information sets used in the formation of 
price expectations, which are often formed only in regard to the direction of 
price movements, are additionally heterogeneous.  
For example, due to overconfidence in their own misjudgement, investors 
could carry recent price increases (generated by chance) too far into the 
future, therefore overpricing a security.  
To summarize this point, market participants might perceive patterns where 
there are none and by carrying them into the future forget that “trees do not 
grow into the sky” (Kahneman and Riepe 1998, Shleifer 2000: 11). 
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The different ways how investment options are presented to people may also 
influence investors decisions. This problem is called (narrow) framing (Shleifer 
2000: 10).  
Consider the following pairs of concurrent decisions6:  
Decision 1. 
a) sure gain of 2.400$ 
b) 25% chance to gain 10.000$ and a 75% chance to gain nothing. 
Decision 2. 
a) sure loss of 7.500$ 
b) 75% chance to lose 10.000$ and 25% chance to lose nothing. 
A majority of people would chose (a) in decision one and (b) in decision two.  
Now consider the following third decision problem: 
Decision 3. 
a) 25% chance to win 2.400$ and a 75% chance to lose 7.600$ 
b) 25% chance to win 2.500$ and a 75% chance to lose 7.500$ 
Easy to answer, one would choose answer (b) in this decision. However, 
returning to the first two decisions, one will discover that the answers most 
people would pick (a and then b), together yield the inferior option (a) in 
problem three.  
The superior option (b) in problem three is obtained by conjoining the two 
options of the first two problems, which most people would reject (Kahneman 
and Riepe 1998).  
This example illustrates a problem of real world financial markets, where 
investors often fail to develop a broader frame on decision-making problems. 
However, even if some market participants act irrationally, the ultimate 
argument of the EMH states that arbitrage will ensure the market to stay in 
equilibrium. 
The next chapter will therefore elaborate possible deviations of security prices 
from their fundamental equilibrium values due to shortcomings of real world 
arbitrage. 
 
  
                                                
6 Based on Kahneman and Riepe (1998). 
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2.5. Limitations of Arbitrage 
 
In chapter 2.2 it was stated that the immediate sales (purchases) of 
overpriced (underpriced) securities by arbitrageurs cause security prices to 
stay in line with their fundamental values, at least that is what the EMH 
predicts. This is so, because the EMH assumes that arbitrage entails no risk 
and trader’s net returns will be at least zero (Shleifer 2000).  
In reality, however, arbitrage implies a considerable risk due to several 
reasons. Adequate substitutes may not always be available, making risk free 
hedges impossible. Arbitrageurs also bear the risk that the price distortions 
caused by irrational (noise) traders increase even further over the short or 
medium run. If prices for example decrease due to a pessimistic market 
mood, which continues to last for several time periods, an arbitrageur may 
sustain severe losses if he has to liquidate the obtained positions before 
prices recover. Risk- averse arbitrageurs might therefore prefer not to behave 
as aggressively as the EMH suggests in order not to lose money (Shleifer 
2000).  
Besides these important shortcomings of arbitrage, this chapter’s emphasis is 
on what can be described as the agency relationship between arbitrageurs 
and the investors in arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Most arbitrage is performed by relatively few professionals, who trade using 
the resources of several other, less informed investors. The dependence of 
arbitrage on outside resources constitutes the main problem of the following 
model. Investors or lenders, who provide arbitrageurs with money, might be 
subject to irrational expectations as described in chapter 2.4. If for example 
the mispricing of a security becomes more severe over the short- or medium 
run, arbitrage opportunities increase. However, less informed investors might 
only perceive that the arbitrageur is losing money and refuse to provide more 
capital, exactly when it would be needed. So arbitrage would become most 
constrained when the opportunities are best and market efficiency would not 
be secured. The responsiveness of arbitrage to investor’s expectations is 
denoted as performance based arbitrage (Shleifer 2000: 89).   
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The following model discusses an irrational underpricing of a specific asset 
over the short run, however, the price will for sure return to its fundamental 
equilibrium value in the long run.  
 
 
2.5.1 A Model of Agents in Limited Arbitrage7 
 
During three time periods, t = 1,2,3 , three types of agents participate in the 
market. Noise traders represent irrational behaviour (as described in chapter 
2.4.), rational arbitrageurs who only trade in this specific market, and rational 
investors who allocate their capital across arbitrageurs also in other markets. 
The fundamental value of the asset is denoted by V and is only known by 
arbitrageurs during period one and two. At time three also noise traders gain 
knowledge on the fundamental value and therefore the price of the asset at 
time three will equal its fundamental value V .   
The reduced form demand function of noise traders during period one and two 
equals QNt = V ! St[ ] / pt . 
S
t
 denotes the undervaluation of the asset by noise traders, so to say the 
pessimistic shock at time t . Arbitrageurs know the first period’s pessimistic 
shock in period one. However, they can only anticipate the second period’s 
shock, which might be either stronger or weaker. By using their capital 
endowment F
t
 (provided by the investors) arbitrageurs take positions against 
the underpricing of noise traders. F
1
 is assumed to be given exogenously but 
F
2
 will be based on investor’s evaluation of the performance of arbitrage.  
If at time t = 2  the price of the security equals its fundamental value, 
arbitrageurs will invest in cash, but if the mispricing continues in period two, 
arbitrageurs will want to invest F
2
 solely in the underpriced asset and 
accordingly the demand will equal QA
2
= F
2
/ p
2
, with p
2
 denoting the market 
price of the asset at time t = 2 . 
For the market to be cleared, unit supply has to equal demand: 
 p
2
= V ! S
2
+ F
2
 (2.3) 
                                                
7 The presentation of the model is based entirely on chapter 4 in Shleifer (2000). 
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It is assumed that F
2
< S
2
, so arbitrageurs are not able to bring the price in 
period two back in line with its fundamental value. In period one, arbitrageurs 
do not necessarily want to invest their whole resources F
1
 in the asset, as the 
mispricing might deepen in the next period, therefore QA
1
= D
1
/ p
1
. In 
accordance the equilibrium condition for period one can be stated as: 
 p
1
= V ! S
1
+ D
1
 (2.4) 
Again the demand stemming from arbitrageurs in the first period is not 
sufficient to fully correct the misperceptions of noise traders.  
Within the specific market for the asset, many arbitrageurs are competing for 
investor’s capital (which is distributed among different markets) in the price 
they charge. It is assumed that for each arbitrageur there exists at least one 
other market participant who can be viewed as a perfect substitute. In addition 
all arbitrageurs face the same marginal costs, regardless of the strategy they 
use. Therefore Bertrand competition causes the price for the service of an 
arbitrageur to be equal to the marginal costs.  
Bayesian investors form beliefs of the expected returns of different arbitrage 
strategies. The heterogeneity of those beliefs assures that total investors 
resources are allocated across all operating arbitrageurs. Investors are not 
equipped with full knowledge of specific arbitrage strategies and therefore 
update their beliefs by looking at past performances. To be precise, an 
investor forms his expectations of future returns of an arbitrage strategy ex 
ante, by looking at the past performance of arbitrageurs.  
If an arbitrageur obtains poor returns and cannot live up to the expectations of 
investors, they will be provided with less capital from investors. Since in the 
specific market segment described in this model all arbitrageurs take the 
same positions, all of them will lose or gain simultaneously.      
Regarding the model, investor’s supply of capital to arbitrageurs is an 
increasing function of the arbitrageurs obtained gross return between the first 
and the second period. Denoting this function by G , the supplied funds in 
period two, F
2
, can be described by: 
 F
2
= F
1
!G (D
1
/ F
1
) ! (p
2
/ p
1
) + (F
1
" D
1
) / F
1[ ]  (2.5) 
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The ratio between the second period’s price and the first period’s price yields 
the return of the asset and the function G  satisfies: G 1( ) = 1,  G ' ! 0,  G '' " 0 . If 
arbitrageurs in this special market segment perform better than a benchmark 
set by investors (based on arbitrage returns in other markets), they will be 
supplied with more funds and vice versa. Present funds provided for 
arbitrageurs therefore respond (exclusively) to past performance, which is 
why one can speak of performance-based-arbitrage. 
Note that the withdrawal of funds when mispricing (caused by noise traders) 
worsens is a perfectly rational response of investors to the problem of 
inferring jointly from past returns on the ability of an arbitrageur and future 
opportunities.  
Let us turn back to equation (2.5) and assume a linear function G :  
 G(x) = ax +1! a,  a " 1 (2.6) 
With x  denoting the arbitrageur’s gross return, a linear function G  yields a 
second period capital supply of:  
 F
2
= a D
1
(p
2
/ p
1
) + (F
1
! D
1
)[ ] + (1! a)F1 = F1 ! aD1(1! p2 / p1)  (2.7) 
According to this equation, the arbitrageur neither gains nor loses funds if net 
returns equal zero. If the second period’s price is higher than the first period’s 
price, the arbitrageur will be provided with more funds and vice versa. 
The variable a  characterizes the sensibility of provided resources to past 
performance. The case a > 1 for example means that funds will be withdrawn 
by investors in response to a poor past performance, whereas a = 1  simply 
means that poor past returns will be met by investors by not supplying any 
additional funds.  
The main point of this modelling is that arbitrage might be most constraint 
when the opportunities (expected returns) are the best. A temporary 
underpricing of the asset due to irrational noise traders yields temporarily low 
returns. Investors observe only the low returns and withdraw their capital, not 
considering that expected future returns have actually increased, since the 
asset price will eventually return to its fundamental value. 
To finalize the structure of the model, the optimization problem of arbitrageurs 
has to be considered. Arbitrageurs want to maximize expected profits of time 
t = 3 , which is equivalent to maximizing the funds they will be provided with in 
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the third period. Since the second period’s noise trader shock is unknown in 
the first period, there is some probability q  that S
2
> S
1
. The probability that 
noise traders will recognize the fundamental value of the asset already in the 
second period, meaning that S
2
= 0 , is denoted by (1! q) . If this is the case 
arbitrageurs will already liquidate their positions at t = 2  and third period’s 
provided funds will equal:  
 W = a(D
1
!V / p
1
+ F
1
" D
1
) + (1" a)F
1
 
If S
2
> S
1
, third period’s funds will be given by: 
 W = (V / p
2
) ! a(D
1
! p
2
/ p
1
+ F
1
" D
1
) + (1" a)F
1[ ]  
and arbitrageurs maximize: 
 
E(W ) = (1! q) a (D
1
"V / p
1
) + F
1
! D
1[ ] + (1! a)F1{ }
+q(V / p
2
) " a (D
1
" p
2
/ p
1
) + F
1
! D
1[ ] + (1! a)F1{ }
 (2.8) 
   
 
2.5.2. Limited Arbitrage and Efficient Markets 
 
Let us consider that a = 1 , so poor past returns obtained by arbitrage will 
cause investors to not supply any additional funds to arbitrageurs. After 
differencing equation (2.8) with respect to D
1
, the first order condition is given 
by:  
 (1! q)(V / p
1
!1) + q(p
2
/ p
1
!1)(V / p
2
) " 0  (2.9) 
The first term in (2.9) can be interpreted as the marginal benefit to 
arbitrageurs from one extra dollar supplied by investors if the market price 
recovers at time t = 2 . The second term describes the forgone investment 
option for arbitrageurs if the mispricing continues during the second period 
and the market recovers at time t = 3 .  
The first order condition will be strictly equal to zero if q  is high enough and 
the price deviation away from the fundamental value severe enough, so that 
arbitrageurs decide to hold back some capital in the first period to invest it in 
the second period. For (2.9) to hold as a strict inequality, the price deviation in 
the first period must be already large enough, q  low enough and the second 
period’s price shock not too large relative to the shock in the first period. In the 
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latter case, when arbitrageurs expect the price in t = 2  to recover rather than 
to decline further, they will choose to fully invest their capital in the first period.  
 
Proposition 1: For any given V, S
1
,  S
2
,  F
1
,  a , there exists a probability q*  
so that for any q > q*  it holds that D
1
< F
1
 and for q < q*  it holds that 
D
1
= F
1
.  
 
Therefore, if the first order condition holds with equality, the market 
equilibrium is given by equations (2.3), (2.4), (2.7) and (2.9). If on the other 
hand (2.9) holds with a strict inequality, the equilibrium will be constituted by 
arbitrageurs fully investing their capital endowment at t = 1, p
1
= V ! S
1
+ F
1
 
and equations (2.3) and (2.7).  
According to Shleifer, both equilibriums are quite plausible (Shleifer 2000: 98). 
The next proposition describes the fact that noise trader shocks will cause 
inefficient market prices. 
 
Proposition 2: For the corner solution (when arbitrageurs are fully 
invested in the first period) it holds that 
dp
1
/ dS
1
< 0,  dp
2
/ dS
2
< 0, dp
1
/ dS
2
= 0 . Equally for the interior solution it 
holds that dp
1
/ dS
1
< 0,  dp
2
/ dS
2
< 0,  dp
1
/ dS
2
= 0 .  
 
In both cases the prices will move the further away from the fundamental 
equilibrium value, the larger are the price shocks caused by irrational (noise) 
traders. At the interior solution, when arbitrageurs hold back some capital in 
the first period to invest it when the mispricing caused by noise traders 
deepens, prices will deviate more strongly during t = 1.  Remember that at the 
beginning of chapter 2.5 it was argued that risk- averse arbitrageurs might not 
fully invest their resources if they fear losses due to further price deviations 
away from the fundamental equilibrium. The agency relationship can therefore 
be regarded as an alternative explanation to the risk aversion approach for 
why arbitrage may be limited under these conditions (Shleifer 2000).  
In the remaining part of the model, however, it will be assumed that 
arbitrageurs fully invest their resources in the first period. Full investment at 
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t = 1 can be seen as a sufficient condition for arbitrageurs having to liquidate 
(part of) their positions in the second period, when noise traders’ pessimism 
causes prices to further decline. 
  
Proposition 3: Assume that arbitrageurs are fully invested at t = 1 and 
noise traders’ misperceptions worsen at t = 2 . Then if a > 1, meaning 
that investors withdraw (part of their) funds for arbitrageurs, it holds that 
F
2
< D
1
 and F
2
/ p
2
< D
1
/ p
1
. 
 
Proposition three therefore describes the case when arbitrageurs have to 
partly bail out of the market (since their cash holdings are not sufficiently high) 
because investors withdraw capital. The price of the asset in period two can 
be described in accordance by:  
 p
2
= V ! S ! aF
1
+ F
1[ ] / 1! aF1 / p1[ ]  (2.10) 
if aF
1
< p
1
, which simply states that in equilibrium arbitrageurs do lose funds 
but still do not bail out of the market completely. The last proposition is 
obtained by differencing (2.10) with respect to S . 
 
Proposition 4: At the equilibrium where arbitrageurs are fully invested at 
t = 1, dp
2
/ dS < !1 and d 2 p
2
/ (dS)
2
< 0 . 
 
If arbitrageurs invest their total capital at t = 1 then prices will fall more than 
one by one in the second period. 
This result is the exact opposite of the assumption that arbitrageurs become 
most aggressive when prices deviate furthest away from their fundamental 
value. When prices move the furthest away from their fundamental values, 
then arbitrageurs hold the smallest positions.    
 
The implications of the model of performance- based arbitrage are strong in 
regard to the efficiency of financial markets. It describes conditions under 
which arbitrage is not able to ensure prices to stay in line with their 
fundamental values (over the short- or medium run). When prices move far 
away from their fundamentals, arbitrageurs even lose money and are unable, 
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due to the agency relationship with investors, to secure market efficiency. The 
limits of arbitrage discussed in this model also seem plausible in the 
evaluation of real world financial markets. Investors in arbitrage funds usually 
have the option to withdraw their capital on relatively short notice. If investors 
believe that an arbitrage fund performs poorly, they can withdraw their 
resources and force the fund to liquidate its positions if it lack’s cash. If 
creditors finance arbitrage positions, then poor performance can also cause 
forced liquidations. Creditors usually demand quick repayments or otherwise 
force the liquidation of collaterals, when they move near to the debt level. Last 
but not least, a possibility that is not captured in this model is that arbitrageurs 
voluntarily liquidate part of their positions. They might do so because of the 
fear that investors will withdraw large amounts of resources later on, due to 
temporarily bad performances or that at some point creditors might force 
liquidations (Shleifer 2000). Of course several other limitations to arbitrage 
that are compatible with this model could be discussed in more detail here. 
However, the reason for including this model within the theoretical part of this 
paper was only to point out that the perfect functioning of arbitrage in real 
world financial markets cannot be always assumed.  In a next step, one could 
raise the question whether or how arbitrageurs have operated in commodity 
markets. Have arbitrageurs been avoiding operating in commodity markets, 
maybe because the calculation and the forecast of fundamental values have 
been too difficult? Or has arbitrage been especially limited in commodity 
markets and prices have therefore exhibited such strong increases?  
 
 
2.6. A Keynesian View of Financial Markets 
 
More than 60 years have passed by since John Maynard Keynes died, 
however, the recent worldwide financial crisis has led to a re-evaluation of his 
concepts. 
The reason why his ideas8 are also included in this paper is that his view of 
speculation and financial markets present sort of the opposition to the 
                                                
8 Stemming from the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936). 
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efficiency hypothesis (as presented in this chapter earlier on). While the EMH 
emphasises the forces causing the efficient functioning of markets, Keynes 
elaborates possible detrimental effects of speculation.  
The expectation of future yields of an asset is based on two parameters. 
Partly our prospects depend on some present facts (as current demand) and 
partly on uncertain future events (for example changes in demand or supply 
conditions).  
The latter are what Keynes denotes as the state of long-term expectations 
(Keynes 1967: 147). Since the knowledge of the factors that will determine 
future yields is very low, the confidence with which we make our forecast is 
especially important. However, the problem with this parameter is that even if 
it governs investor’s decisions, it is hard to measure. Nonetheless, Keynes 
identifies the importance of investor psychology, which is the main focus of 
contemporary behavioural economics (Keynes 1967: 149). 
In addition to the very little knowledge we have of future asset price changes, 
another factor can possibly cause some instability of the financial system.  
The daily revaluation of asset prices on Stock Markets greatly influences the 
formation of (long-term) expectations and therefore the current rate of 
investment. However, daily revaluations of assets in well- organized markets 
are based on the (average) expectations of traders rather than on the 
professional opinion of the entrepreneur. In the case of commodities, the 
prices of futures contracts are determined by the demand in the respective 
futures markets. However, the average expectation of the commodity traders 
actually determining the prices of commodity futures may be based on weaker 
grounds than the professional expertise of producers of the physical 
commodities.  
So how does this revaluation work in practice, if performed by agents that 
may be less informed than others?  
Agents’ uncertain expectations are based on a convention that implies the 
continued existence of the present state of the world, as long as no specific 
reasons to believe otherwise appear (Keynes 1967: 152). 
This convention can be compared to the proposition of the EMH that the best 
forecast for tomorrows price is today’s price. The convention is therefore 
based on the belief that the market, in relation to the present information set, 
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truly knows best. Over the short run (or a sequence of short periods) 
investments therefore are considered rather safe.   
However, Keynes identifies several factors that lead to the instability of the 
above described convention.  
First, short run fluctuations of returns tend to have an excessive influence on 
the evaluation of assets. Also in the commodity price boom it could have very 
likely been the case that market participants invested in commodities due to 
recent price increases, rather than due to a careful consideration of long 
(medium) run prospects. 
Second, he emphasizes the (irrational) influence of the prevailing market 
mood on asset prices. Valuations of the latter that are based on a (mass 
psychological) convention are subject to sudden changes due to alterations of 
the prevailing opinion, which may result from other influences than 
fundamental changes. Especially during times when the continuous 
persistence of the present state of the world seams less realistic, financial 
markets will be characterized by optimistic or pessimistic phases (Keynes 
1967: 154). 
This argument usually constitutes an important factor in the line of argument 
used by supporters of the inefficiency hypothesis.  
The last factor (that is presented in this paper) brought up by Keynes to 
challenge the stability of the before described convention, refers to the 
argument of arbitrage. In the efficiency hypothesis prices stay in line with their 
fundamental values because rational investors would react quickly to irrational 
deviations of prices from their equilibrium values. If an asset is priced too 
high, rational investors (arbitrageurs) will react and quickly sell their holdings 
of this asset and thereby bring back the price to its fundamental value. 
However, what if rational investors do not act as just described but rather wait 
for further price increases to obtain even higher profits? Then prices could 
systematically deviate from their fundamental equilibrium price.  
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According to Keynes this is the case, as rational investors are not concerned 
about an investment’s real value, but rather how the average opinion of 
market participants will value this investment a certain period hence: 
 
Thus the professional investor is forced to concern himself with the 
anticipation of impeding changes, in the news or the atmosphere, of the 
kind by which experience shows that the mass psychology of the market 
is most influenced. This is the inevitable result of investment markets 
organised with a view to so-called liquidity (Keynes 1967: 154). 
 
According to this logic, the argument goes as far as describing this behaviour 
not as irrational (as the EMH does), but rather as rational (within an irrational 
environment). However, the existence of rational investors, basing their 
expectations on fundamental factors, is not denied but still the dynamics of 
how arbitrage works are questioned: “There is no clear evidence from 
experience that the investment policy which is socially advantageous 
coincides with that which is most profitable” (Keynes 1967: 157). 
Potential deviations from rationality are further aggravated by the human 
nature, the urge for action rather than passivity and the preference for quick 
returns. 
Summing up all of these arguments, the term speculation as it is used in this 
paper is defined with a little help by Keynes as the activity of forecasting the 
psychology of the market (Keynes 1967: 158). 
 
        
2.7. Price Dynamics Predicted by the EMH and its Critics 
 
The perception of financial markets and therefore of asset price dynamics 
differs greatly between the efficient market hypothesis and what can be 
denoted as the inefficiency hypothesis. In efficient markets, where traders are 
fully rational and equipped with full knowledge, prices always stay in line with 
their fundamental values. At most, price deviations can occur over the short 
run, since positive trading and information costs cause a (very small) lag of 
prices reacting to new information (Schulmeister 2009). However, an 
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endogenous overshooting of prices over the medium- and long run, caused by 
traders misperceptions, irrational trading or in short by destabilizing 
speculation is impossible. In contrast to the belief in efficient financial markets, 
its critics propose that irrational behaviour and the effects of limited arbitrage 
exert a substantial influence on asset price dynamics. For example, traders 
often forecast future price movements by simply assuming that price 
dynamics of the near past will continue, which was described by Keynes 
(1967). However, by doing so traders violate maxims of probability theory (see 
chapter 2.4) and simply perceive patterns and models where there are no 
patterns. In commodity futures markets, technical trading models are widely 
used. These models try to predict future price dynamics by constructing a 
forecast based on past prices and so might well be subject to the irrational 
behaviour just described. Price runs are therefore not only be lengthened by 
speculation, but traders might even construct (future) price models that are 
based rather on traders psychology than on fundamental factors. As a result, 
(commodity) prices constantly overshoot their fundamental equilibrium values 
in both directions (Schulmeister 2009).   
The following graph finally illustrates the theoretical differences between the 
assumptions of the classical formulation of the EMH, the more sensitively 
formulated efficiency hypothesis and the inefficiency hypothesis. 
 
Figure 1: Different Scenarios of Price Dynamics 
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This graph illustrates three different paths of asset price dynamics, based on 
the predictions of the before mentioned hypotheses. Scenario 1 equals the 
dynamics according to the EMH, assuming perfect knowledge, rational 
behaviour and no transaction/information costs. Scenario 2 illustrates the 
price dynamics as predicted by the fundamentalist hypothesis, relaxing the 
assumptions of no transaction/information costs and traders do not know the 
expectations of the other market participants.  
Finally in scenario 3, according to the bull-bear hypothesis, not all traders are 
equipped with full knowledge and behave fully rational. Furthermore, 
expectations are often formed only qualitatively (regarding the direction of the 
price move) (Schulmeister 2009). 
At time t=1, news about the fundamental value of a security hits the market.   
In scenario 1, the new information is immediately reflected in the price, which 
therefore jumps instantaneously from 100 to the new fundamental equilibrium 
value 104. The price stays there, until at t=3 new information again reaches 
the market, leading again to an immediate price jump from 104 to the new 
equilibrium 102. 
Finally at time t=5, the price again instantaneously jumps due to the arrival of 
new information. 
 
In scenario 2, the price reaches its new equilibrium, after new information 
arrived at time t=1, only gradually after a series of transactions took place, 
leading to a time lag of one period (from point A to C). 
However, the price then stays at its new equilibrium value. After new 
information arrived at point D, again it takes one period for the price to reach 
the new fundamental equilibrium (from D to F). 
Also after new information arrives for the third time (at point H), it takes a 
gradual discovery process for the price to reach the new fundamental 
equilibrium. Again, after a series of transactions, the price then sticks at the 
new fundamental value. 
In scenario 3, contrary to the other scenarios, traders exhibit a “trending 
behaviour” and artificially lengthen price runs, due to their bullish expectations 
(Schulmeister 2009). 
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After new information arrives at time t=1, the price gradually increases, 
however, the price increase does not stop at the new fundamental equilibrium 
value (at point C), but overshoots up to point K. 
At point K news again hit the market, initiating a price decrease. Since once 
again (some) traders base their expectations on the most recent development 
(a price decrease), they lengthen the downward price run to overshoot the 
fundamental equilibrium value like before (of course into the other direction). 
At time t=5, the same patterns are observed again. Traders incorporate the 
new information, however, overshooting the equilibrium again due to 
strengthening the price trend. 
Therefore, while in scenario 1 and scenario 2 the price (in the latter case 
gradually) reaches its fundamental equilibrium and stays there (until new 
information arrives), the price in scenario 3 is constantly overshooting its 
fundamental equilibrium (in both directions) due to traders lengthening price 
runs according to their bullish (or bearish) expectations (Schulmeister 2009). 
To summarize the results of the above discussed scenarios, short term price 
volatility is zero in the EMH scenario, only low in the fundamentalist scenario, 
however, considerably high in the bull-bear scenario. 
Over the long run, scenarios 1 and 2 predict prices to stay in line with their 
fundamental values, as trades are governed by full rationality and knowledge. 
Scenario 3 on the other hand yields high volatility also over the long run, with 
the price overshooting the equilibrium price in both directions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
3. On the Empirics of Commodity Price Dynamics  
 
 
The sharp increase in commodity prices, beginning already in 2003, has 
raised serious doubts about the efficiency of commodity markets and calls for 
a careful reconsideration of the dynamics of those prices.  
Prices of nearly every important agricultural commodity tripled between 2006 
and mid 2008, only to then collapse impressively.  
The spot price for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil skyrocketed from 
around 60 US dollars per barrel at the beginning of 2007 to a peak of over 
140 US dollars per barrel in mid 2008. Few months later the spot price for 
WTI crude oil was back at around 60 dollars per barrel. 
 
Figure 2: IMF Commodity Price Index 
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Data Source: International Monetary Fond (IMF) 
 
Not only do the impressive commodity price dynamics attract attention 
regarding the question of market efficiency as such, but they do have strong 
impacts on countless people worldwide, especially the poorest. 
Although agreeing over these strong external effects, economists still have 
not reached a consensus on the causes of the sharp price hikes of 
commodities between 2006 and mid 2008.  
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In a survey conducted by the Wall Street Journal, the majority of economists 
saw the cause of the price dynamics in fundamental factors, an opinion based 
on the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2008). 
However, also scepticism has arisen regarding the efficiency of commodity 
futures markets.   
 
So was it really the shifts in fundamental factors that caused prices to 
increase so strongly between 2007 and mid 2008 and then crash over just a 
very short period? Or was it speculation that led to the formation of a 
commodity price bubble, condemned to burst at some point in time?  
Could it be that a realistic characterization of the price dynamics of the last 
years includes both fundamental changes and the price driving effects of 
speculation? 
 
The hypothesis that will be elaborated over the next pages characterizes the 
commodity price dynamics as a bubble like movement, which was linked 
strongly to other macroeconomic and financial factors, particularly the recent 
economic crisis.  
Some price increases, for example of corn and wheat, may have emanated 
from changes in fundamental factors. The demand for wheat and especially 
for corn increased due to the production of biofuel out of these commodities. 
Supply shocks, as severe droughts in Australia in 2006/2007 and stagnating 
yields in other major producing countries also played a role in the price hike. 
The costs for discovering new oil repositories rose and the advanced 
depletion of this exhaustible resource obviously led to price increases. 
Additionally the demand for crude oil from emerging economies constantly 
rose over the preceding years.  
Prices of crude oil as well as of the other commodities were also affected by 
the continuing depreciation of the US dollar after 2002. 
However, the enormous dimension of the boom was caused by 
overconfidence and a misconception by investors, or to make a long story 
short, by excessive speculation. 
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At the beginning of the 21st century, financial market participants were in 
search of new investment opportunities. Although real estate was the more 
popular investment choice, financial institutions also increasingly started to 
use commodities as an asset class. 
Up to that point, commodity futures markets mainly served the purpose of risk 
hedging for producers and consumers of the actual physical commodity and 
even more important, futures prices have been used also as a benchmark for 
spot prices. According to the CFTC: 
Futures contracts are often relied on for price discovery as well as for 
hedging. In many physical commodities (especially agricultural 
commodities), cash market participants base spot and forward prices on 
the futures prices that are “discovered” in the competitive, open auction 
market of a futures exchange. 
(http://www.cftc.gov/educationcenter/economicpurpose.html). 
The additional demand for commodity futures stemming from speculators 
therefore contributed to price increases already between 2003 and 2007.  
From 2007 on, it was mainly speculation that was driving up prices.  
Based on the fundamental changes, investors developed excessive bullish 
expectations. Additionally the outbreak of the financial crisis became 
apparent. Both reasons provoked investors to channel considerably more 
money into commodity futures, rocketing futures prices to fundamentally not 
justifiable levels. Because futures prices have been used as benchmarks for 
spot prices, the price dynamics in futures markets spilled over to spot 
markets, where prices also rocketed from 2007 on.  
As many investors tended to allocate their capital across different 
commodities by investing in indices, also the prices of several other 
commodities, especially metals, increased. 
Speculation was not the causation, but the moving spirit of the tremendous 
price dynamics between 2007 and 2009. 
 
Before taking the first steps of the data exploration, one essential distinction 
has to be clarified.  
What is the actual difference between speculation and investment? 
 34 
According to John Maynard Keynes, speculation is the activity of forecasting 
the psychology of the market, and the term enterprise (which can be regarded 
as conservative investment) denotes the activity of forecasting the prospective 
yield of an asset (Keynes 1967: 158). Speculation essentially differs from 
investment in regard to the risk of the transaction and the time scale. 
Speculation incurs the risk of losses in order to earn above average returns. 
Also the time horizon of speculative activities is smaller than the one of 
conservative investments. Speculators are rather interested in making quick 
money than in earning steady rates of return over a longer period.  
They usually have no interest in actually consuming the commodity, but want 
to profit from the purchase and resale (or vice versa if a speculator is betting 
on a bear market) of the commodity futures contract.  
One could also include hoarding by consumers into the definition of 
speculation. Hoarding can actually serve the purpose of storing the 
commodity for later consumption if a longer bull market is expected. There are 
signs that hording and panic purchases by companies or even countries 
played a significant role in the price hike of crude oil. However, in this paper 
the term hoarding will not be considered in detail, as reliable data are very 
scarce. 
 
The analysis of commodity price dynamics will be performed on five key 
commodities, namely crude oil, wheat, corn, copper and gold.9 Each of these 
commodities was subject to tremendous price increases after 2003 and 
especially between 2007 and mid 2008. The data was obtained from 
Thompson Datastream and is composed of daily (spot and futures) prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 All of which are included in the IMF commodity price index. 
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3.1. Some Observations on Commodity Price Dynamics 
 
Figures 3 – 7 show the respective spot and futures prices of the five 
exemplary commodities.  
Neither the spot nor the futures prices are stationary series but do exhibit 
strong volatilities. Mostly prices fluctuate around underlying market trends. 
These so-called bull and bear markets can last up to over a year. Earlier on it 
was stated that commodity prices react to fundamental changes. The 
responses of prices to real economic or political events can be observed in 
the price graphs. 
Turning to the prices of WTI crude oil, e.g. the beginning of the Gulf war in 
1990 activated a strong bull market.  
Although the peak in the second half of 1990 seems rather insignificant 
compared to the enormous high in 2008, prices doubled already over that 
period of time.  
  
Figure 3: Daily Crude Oil Price Movements 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
The liberalization of Kuwait then turned the bull- into a bear market, with 
prices falling back to the levels before the war. 
Another bull market, initiated by strong economic growth, took off in 1999 and 
turned into a bear market during the last quarter of 2000. 
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Also wheat and corn prices were shaped by upward and downward trends. 
The most notable bull markets (before the 2007 price hike) took place in 
1995/1996. At first glance, these events resemble the price hike ten years 
later only that in 2007 the upward trend lasted longer. Wheat production 
stagnated in 1995 and yields even declined. This supply shock led to a peak 
price of over 100 US cents per bushel in 1996.  
 
Figure 4: Daily Wheat Price Movements 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
Over the same period also corn production did not reach the expected level. 
However, in this case it was rather a demand shock that led to the strong 
price hike. After news spread that corn production was lagging behind, 
consumers started hoarding the commodity and thereby drove the price up. 
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Figure 5: Daily Corn Price Movements 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
Gold and Copper prices appear nearly stationary over the 90’s, however, they 
were also fluctuating around short run trends. No pronounced bull market was 
observed in gold price dynamics, which exhibited the smallest variances over 
the 90’s of all commodities presented in this paper. Copper prices only 
increased rather strongly in 1994, when mine extraction in the United States, 
the world’s second largest copper mine producer, stagnated due to heavy 
rainfalls in 1993 (http://www.minerals.usgs.gov).  
 
Figure 6: Daily Gold Price Movements 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
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Figure 7: Daily Copper Price Movements 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
Commodity prices have often been associated with a random walk without 
drift. Over the period 1990 – 2000 it seems that the dynamics could be 
consistent with this assumption, particularly often taken by the EMH. Prices 
appear to have wandered around as unpredictably as were the supply or 
demand shocks that caused the amplitudes. However, beginning with the year 
2003 the picture changed. Prices followed a clearly identifiable upwards trend 
that culminated in peaks at least twice as high as the 1990’s average. In mid 
2008, this strong bull market turned into a strong downwards run.  
In consideration of the price dynamics of the 21st century the random walk 
without drift hypothesis has to be rejected. At least from 2003 on prices 
followed distinctive trends.  
After taking a perfunctory look at the price dynamics, the next chapter will go 
into more detail regarding commodity fundamentals. For this purpose, supply 
and demand changes shall be compared to price movements over an equal 
time span.  
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3.2. Supply and Demand Conditions in Commodity Spot Markets 
 
After taking a first glance at commodity spot and futures prices this section will 
include supply and demand conditions in the underlying commodity markets 
into the analysis. Due to the use of several graphs again, only the results for 
crude oil, wheat and corn will be shown. The logic deduced from looking at 
these three commodities, however, also applies to gold and copper. The 
introduction of data on supply of and demand for commodities into the 
analysis shall help to evaluate the validity of the hypothesis, that it was 
speculation that caused recent price increases. By contrast, fundamentalists 
suggest that exclusively (or at least to a great extent) changes in the supply of 
and demand for a commodity caused price dynamics.  
 
Total worldwide oil production until 2003 increased from around 70,2 million 
barrels per day in 1995, to roughly 78 million barrels per day in 2002, which is 
equivalent to an average annual growth rate of 1,57 percent.  
 
Figure 8: Crude Oil Supply after 1995 
 
Data Source: Energy Information Agency (EIA) 
 
Global oil consumption over the same period grew slightly stronger, by 
roughly 1,62 percent each year. As a consequence, commercial OECD oil 
inventories decreased between 1995 and 2002 (figure 10), however, crude oil 
spot and futures prices only rose very modestly, from roughly 18 dollars per 
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barrel to around 26 dollars per barrel in 2002. Against the background of 
demand slightly exceeding the production of crude oil, combined with 
decreases in commercial inventories, the modest price increase seems 
perfectly justified by fundamental changes.  
 
Figure 9: Crude Oil Demand after 1995 
 
Data Source: Energy Information Agency (EIA) 
 
However, it was the period after 2003 the speculation hypothesis targets.  
Between 2003 and 2007, global oil production picked up in speed and grew 
faster than global oil consumption. In 2004 and 2005 global oil supply even 
exceeded demand for oil; during 2006 the latter was marginally higher than 
production. As can be seen from figure 8, the increase in oil production 
between 2002 and 2005 mainly stemmed from additional OPEC supply.  
As one would expect, commercial OECD inventories increased from 2003 on, 
due to the increase in production.  
Comparing this period to the years between 1995 and 2002, one would 
expect spot and futures prices to have modestly decreased between 2003 
and 2007, however, it was during that time when the oil price bull market 
started, with price increases from around 26 US dollars per barrel to roughly 
65 US dollars per barrel in 2006.  
It seems therefore rather implausible that it was solely market fundamentals 
that caused the strong price increases between 2003 and 2006. 
 
 41 
Figure 10: Commercial and Government Oil Inventories 
 
Data Source: Energy Information Agency 
 
The most spectacular crude oil price increases occurred between 2007 and 
mid 2008, when prices reached a peak of over 145 US dollars per barrel. 
During both years demand for marginally exceeded the supply of crude oil, 
which is also the reason for the decline in commercial OECD inventories.  
As during the years before 2007, again it seems hard to believe that the crude 
oil bull market was caused by fundamentals. 
 
Figure 11: Daily Crude Oil Spot and Futures Prices 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
The difference between supply and demand was not considerably higher than 
during the years from 1995 onwards. Also if the extent of the decrease in 
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inventories between 2007/2008 is compared to the increase between 2002 
and 2007, it seems implausible that it could have caused such strong price 
increases.  
It is often argued that increasing demand from emerging economies, most 
notably China, has greatly influenced commodity prices (Schulmeister 2009). 
Figure 9 therefore also contains China’s demand for crude oil. As can be 
seen, oil consumption of OECD countries stagnated between 1995 and 2008. 
The increasing global demand for crude oil therefore resulted almost 
exclusively from emerging markets. Chinese oil consumption, at least 
according to official data, has only increased very moderately over the past 
decade. The argument that Chinese demand for crude oil caused the 
impressive crude oil bull market between 2007 and 2008 is therefore also 
rather implausible. One question, however, that arises in the context of 
Chinese consumption is whether official data really captures the true extend 
of Chinese oil consumption.  
Nevertheless, after analysing the development of the demand for and supply 
of crude oil, the speculation hypothesis seems to capture the causes of the 
price dynamics better than the efficiency hypothesis, as it is implausible that 
market fundamentals caused the strong bull markets between 2003 and mid 
2008. 
 
Let us now turn to the analysis of grain market conditions, namely those for 
corn and wheat. It can be anticipated that also for these two commodities, the 
fundamentalist hypothesis does not seem to be able to satisfactorily explain 
price increases.  
Global production of wheat slightly exceeded consumption between 1995 and 
2000, whereas from 2000 until 2004 the conditions were vice versa. 
Accordingly global wheat stocks increased until the year 2000, only to then 
decrease until 2004. The logic of supply and demand determining prices 
again would suggest that wheat prices should have increased between 2000 
and 2004. However, they did not increase considerably, with the exception of 
a small bull market in 2002.  
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Figure 12: World Market Conditions for Wheat 
 
Data Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
 
It was from 2007 on, when wheat prices started to rocket. However, over that 
period wheat supply increased on average by 5,8 percent per year, while 
consumption annually increased only by 1,7 percent.  
Again, if one compares the supply of and demand for wheat dynamics and 
their effects on prices over the years before 2007, it does not seem realistic 
that it was the fundamental changes that caused the strong bull market 
between 2007 and 2008. 
 
Figure 13: Daily Wheat Spot and Futures Prices 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
 
 44 
Figure 14: World Market Conditions for Corn 
 
Data Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
 
Corn production and consumption dynamics were shaped very similar to 
wheat supply and demand dynamics. Between 2000 and 2004 consumption 
of corn exceeded the production, which caused corn stocks to decrease 
continuously until 2004. However, prices did not rise significantly during that 
period, but increased strongly between 2007 and 2008. Over that period corn 
production exceeded consumption and also stocks increased moderately.  
 
Figure 15: Daily Corn Spot and Futures Prices 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
 
 45 
The analysis of the underlying market conditions leads to the conclusion that 
commodity prices overshot their fundamental equilibrium prices considerably. 
Especially the bull markets between 2007 and mid 2008 were not justified by 
changes in the demand for or the supply of the commodities. This conclusion 
is backed up by the fact that the prices of crude oil, corn and wheat decreased 
virtually over night by over 50 percent in the second half of the year 2008, with 
fundamentals again not changing significantly. One reason for the strong price 
increases despite the absence of fundamental changes therefore could have 
been uninformed trading. Some markets participants may have responded to 
information other than on fundamental changes and therefore have traded on 
noise rather than on real information (UNCTAD 2009). Additionally a 
considerable part of investors may simply have followed the (trend exploiting) 
strategies of other market participants, which could be called herd behaviour. 
Both reasons indicate the failure of the Efficient Market Hypothesis on 
commodity markets. In an empirical analysis, however, it is not easy to 
distinguish between informed and uninformed traders, due to data restrictions.   
 
   
3.3. An Analysis of Trading Activities in Commodity Futures Markets 
 
In contrast to supply and demand factors, trading activities in commodity 
futures markets changed much more significantly over the period of large 
price increases.  
The number of outstanding futures and options contracts on international 
commodity futures markets rose from roughly seven million contracts in 2003, 
to around 25 million contracts during the first quarter of 2008. The notional 
amount of over-the-counter commodity contracts increased from 2,9 billion US 
dollars in June 2005 to 7,6 billion US dollars in June 2007 (Bank of 
International Settlement, Quarterly Reviews). Also total turnover on 
international markets exhibited a sharp increase, as the following graph 
shows.  
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Figure 16: Turnover of Commodity Contracts 
 
Data Source: Bank of International Settlement, Quarterly Review 
 
This parallel development of financial activities on futures markets and the 
respective price increases could indicate the important role of speculation in 
commodity price dynamics.  
To further investigate the role of speculation in recent commodity price 
dynamics, indicators provided by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) will be analysed. In their weekly- published Commitment 
of Traders report, the CFTC provides data on trading activities on commodity 
futures markets. The relevant market places for the commodities used in this 
paper are the Chicago Board of Trade (Corn and Wheat) and the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (Copper, Crude Oil and Gold). 
Within their reports, the CFTC divides traders into two groups, commercial 
and non-commercial traders.  
Traders obtaining commodity positions for hedging purposes are classified as 
commercial, while otherwise they will be captured as non-commercial. 
However, the distinction between the two categories is not clear in reality, as 
the increasing number of market participants and the evolution of more 
complex trading instruments complicate a definite determination. Furthermore, 
the distinction is based on a declaration traders have to fill out with the 
commission, leaving latitude for speculators to define (at least part of) their 
activities as commercial in order to bypass speculative position limits 
(UNCTAD 2009).   
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Additionally, since January 2006, the CFTC has further disaggregated data on 
traders by including a third category into their reports. The category 
Commodity Index Traders (CIT) contains financial players as investment or 
pension funds and swap dealers. However, data is only available for selective 
agricultural commodities, relevant for this paper only corn and wheat.  
 
Data on the activities of Index Traders are of special interest as in discussions 
on commodity speculation they are often regarded as the elephant in the 
room, due to their large and long-only positions. Tables 1 and 2 not only 
provide evidence of the large proportion of open interest index traders 
accounted for on futures markets, but also on their almost exclusive 
engagement in long positions.10  
The number of index traders is very small, less than 30 traders for each 
commodity (CFTC, Commitment of Traders Report). The average size of their 
long positions, however, is very large, as their positions account for a large 
proportion of total open interest.  
 
 
 
                                                
10 Open Interest denotes the total of all futures contracts in a market that have not 
been offset by transaction, delivery etc. One futures contract of corn or wheat 
includes 5000 bushels of the respective commodity. 
Table 1: Composition of Open Interest Long between 2006 - 2008
2006 2007 2008
Wheat CBOT
Pct. OI Non-commercial 35,73 39,92 41,31
Pct. OI Commercial 14,81 13,17 8,99
Pct. OI CIT 41,55 39,18 42,73
Non-reporting 7,9 7,73 6,97
Corn CBOT
Pct. OI Non-commercial 41,01 42,57 43,71
Pct. OI Commercial 19,64 25,01 25,48
Pct. OI CIT 26,15 21 21,36
Non-reporting 13,2 11,4 9,45
Data Source: CFTC, Commitment of Traders Report
Percentage share in Open Interest long
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One has to keep in mind that prices in futures markets have been determined 
by buy (or sell) orders. Large long positions held by index traders therefore 
may well have driven up futures prices (at least temporarily). For example, the 
increasing US ethanol production has often been used as an argument to 
explain corn price increases. However, index traders accumulated enough 
corn contracts between 2003 and 2008 to fuel the entire US ethanol industry 
at full capacity for one year, which would put the United States in first place of 
worldwide ethanol production. Regarding wheat, index speculators obtained 
enough wheat contracts over the last years to satisfy the entire US household 
consumption for two years (Masters 2008a: 5).  
As for crude oil, copper and gold no data on index speculation were available, 
therefore the ratio of non-commercial long- to total long positions was 
considered.  
However, the analysis did not provide any clear evidence for an obvious 
correlation between the share of non-commercial positions in total positions 
and the respective futures prices. 
Only after mid 2008, when futures prices decreased sharply, a weak 
correlation might have existed as the ratios for gold and copper also 
decreased rather significantly.  
2006 2007 2008
Wheat CBOT
Pct. OI Non-commercial 37,85 41,34 46,02
Pct. OI Commercial 48,09 42,96 35,93
Pct. OI CIT 0,975 2,2 5,95
Non-reporting 13 13,5 12,1
Corn CBOT
Pct. OI Non-commercial 32.53 33,32 38,2
Pct. OI commercial 47,01 49,55 45,07
Pct. OI CIT 0,5 0,67 2,41
Non-reporting 19,96 16,46 14,32
Data Source: CFTC, Commitment of Traders Report
Table 2: Composition of Open Interest Short between 2006 - 2008
Percentage share in Open Interest short
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But as already mentioned before, one has to keep in mind the shortcomings 
of the (aggregated) CFTC data on market participants, especially since index 
traders were mostly classified as commercial traders (UNCTAD 2009).  
 
 
3.4. Comparing the Composition of Commodity Price Runs During Bull 
Markets 
 
Any primary bull market can be caused by two different dynamics (or a 
combination of those). Either short term upward runs last longer than their 
counter motions, or they are steeper. The same logic obviously applies, vice 
versa, to primary bear markets. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis predicts that prices react quickly to new 
information and move almost instantaneously into the direction at which 
fundamental changes point. According to this logic, the reason for a bull 
market should be that upward runs are steeper than downward runs, since 
prices adjust quickly to their new fundamental values. In a bull market, 
however, upward runs may also last longer than downward runs.   
If speculation plays the decisive role in a bull market, then the dynamics 
should rather be the other way around. The concept of technical analysis, the 
most common tool used by commodity speculators, tries to capitalize on 
observable trends by betting either on their persistence or their reversal.  
By buying additional commodity contracts, speculators who expect further 
price increases therefore prolong a bull market.  
 
To gain further information on the characteristics of the strong price increases 
over the last years, the dynamics within primary bull markets were 
investigated.11 
For each commodity two well pronounced bull markets were chosen and the 
length as well as the slope of price runs within the long- term trend was 
                                                
11 A primary market is defined to last for a year or longer. Within the analysis, 
however, this concept was loosened, as some of the analysed bull markets lasted 
shorter than one year.  
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analysed.12 Table 3 shows the average duration and average daily price 
change of upward runs in futures bull markets. Table 4 displays the results for 
downward runs within the same bull markets.13  
 
 
 
                                                
12 The same kind of exercise was already carried out by Schulmeister (1987) and 
Schulmeister (2009). 
13 Both based on original data. 
Table 3: Upward Runs of Futures Prices during Bull Markets
No. of upward runs
Average duration of 
upward runs in days
Average change in 
daily prices during 
upward runs
1.7.2004 - 30.5.2006 128 2,14 0,89 dollars per barrel
2.2.2007 - 3.7.2008 98 2,08 1,42 dollars per barrel
2.5.2006 - 16.10.2006 34 1,88
6,71 US cents per 
bushel
4.4.2007 - 18.3.2008 58 2,41
16,80 US cents per 
bushel
15.9.2006 - 22.2.2007 32 2,22
5,69 US cents per 
barrel
2.8.2007 - 2.7.2008 53 2,58
8,02 US cents per 
bushel
15.7.2005 - 11.5.2006 53 2,42
4,94 US dollars per 
troy ounce
17.8.2007 - 18.3.2008 34 2,71
7,79 US dollars per 
troy ounce
5.7.2005 - 11.5.2006 55 2,49
3,18 US cents per 
pound
31.1.2007 - 4.5.2007 17 2,47
5,41 US cents per 
pound
Data Source: Thompson Datastream
Copper Futures
Crude Oil Futures
Wheat Futures
Corn Futures
Gold Futures
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During the 2/2/2007 – 3/7/2008 crude oil futures bull market, upward runs 
were on average by 20% longer than downward runs (2,08 days compared to 
1,68 days). The slope of upward price changes was just by roughly 13% 
steeper compared to downward runs. The average duration of upward runs 
during the 4/4/2007 – 18/3/2008 wheat futures bull market was also by 20% 
longer than their counter movements, while daily price changes during upward 
movements were steeper by just 13 percent.  
Comparing the length of downward runs with upward runs also in the other 
bull markets, a clear pattern emerges.  
In all out of the ten bull markets, upward runs lasted considerably longer than 
downward movements, on average by more than 25%. The most pronounced 
differences were observed in the copper bull markets, were upward runs 
lasted longer by over a third.  
However, in nine out of ten bull markets also the slope of upward movements 
was steeper than the slope of their counter runs, on average by 17%. Only 
during the 2004 – 2006 crude oil bull market downward runs were steeper.  
 
Table 4: Downward Runs of Futures Prices during Bull Markets
No. of downward 
runs
Average duration of 
downward runs in 
days
Average change in 
daily prices during 
downward runs
1.7.2004 - 30.5.2006 127 1,77
0,93 US dollars per 
barrel
2.2.2007 - 3.7.2008 97 1,68
1,23 US dollars per 
barrel
2.5.2006 - 16.10.2006 33 1,69
5,63 US cents per 
bushel
4.4.2007 - 18.3.2008 57 1,93
14,62 US cents per 
bushel
15.9.2006 - 22.2.2007 31 1,42
4,71 US cents per 
bushel
2.8.2007 - 2.7.2008 52 1,98
6,37 US cents per 
bushel
15.7.2005 - 11.5.2006 52 1,67
3,79 US dollars per 
troy ounce
17.8.2007 - 18.3.2008 33 1,85
5,94 US dollars per 
troy ounce
5.7.2005 - 11.5.2006 54 1,59
2,18 US cents per 
pound
31.1.2007 - 4.5.2007 16 1,62
4,1 US cents per 
pound
Data Source: Thompson Datastream
Gold Futures
Copper Futures
Crude Oil Futures
Wheat Futures
Corn Futures
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The fact that short- term upward runs always lasted longer than downward 
runs supports the logic of the speculation hypothesis. By betting on the 
persistence of upward trends, speculators protracted them at the same time.   
Especially the crude oil bull market between mid 2004 and mid 2006 fits the 
speculation logic, since upward runs not only lasted considerably longer than 
downward runs, but also exhibited the smaller slope. 
However, these findings are put into perspective since in all other cases price 
level changes during upward trends were higher than during downward 
trends. 
Another, although more ambiguous, pattern emerges if one compares the 
results of the different time horizons of the investigated bull markets. In three 
out of five cases during 2007 – 2008, the duration of upward runs was longer 
than during the same commodity’s earlier bull market. In four out of five cases 
the short- term downward trends over the posterior period lasted longer 
compared to the earlier bull market.  
E.g. compared to the 2006 wheat bull market, the average duration of upward 
runs during the 2007/2008 wheat bull market increased by further 20 percent, 
so did the length of downward runs by additional 13 percent. While an upward 
run within the 2006 – 2007 corn futures bull market lasted on average 2,22 
days, the average duration increased to 2,58 days between 2007 and 2008. 
One possible explanation for the increased durations of price runs during bull 
markets the year before the price crash in 2008 could be the bandwagon 
effect.   
With the economic crisis on sight and spreading information on money making 
opportunities with commodity futures speculation, additional speculators, even 
amateurs, got into the game. By also using trend following trading techniques, 
the extra number of speculators that entered the market further extended 
upward runs within the bull markets. Also the dimension of average price 
increases during upward (downward) runs within 2007/2008 bull markets 
increased. Compared to the earlier bull market the average daily price change 
during the 2007 – 2008 wheat futures bull market more than doubled. As in 
the pattern before, the slope of price increases during upward runs is steeper 
than the slope of price changes during downward movements.   
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In this case, however, stronger daily price alterations could well have 
stemmed from additional speculative demand.  
 
Both detected patterns of this partial analysis are in line with the speculation 
hypothesis. Persisting short- term price runs seem to have contributed 
considerably to primary bull markets.  
The fact that daily price changes during upward movements were bigger, 
however, suggests that also fundamental changes influenced the dynamics. 
One question that arises is whether the upward runs are sufficiently longer 
than downward runs during a bull market to conclude that speculation did 
cause bull market. Which number would mean “sufficiently longer”? 
And is it possible that, especially during 2007/2008, increasing speculation, 
panic- acquisitions or hoarding caused the strong changes in price levels?  
To draw a definite conclusion, further investigation of the price dynamics 
within primary bull markets would be required.  
 
 
3.5 Krugman’s Propositions and their Shortcomings  
 
In the preceding exercise I concluded that the persistence of upward runs 
during commodity bull markets indicated a price driving effect of trend 
following trading techniques, thus speculation. 
Since commodity futures prices have been used as benchmarks for spot 
prices, speculative demand in the futures market determined also spot prices. 
In a situation where speculation in the futures market shaped spot prices, 
Paul Krugman brought up two arguments. 
First, price increases in the spot market should have caused a reduction in the 
demand for the physical commodity. For the market to still be in equilibrium, 
the excess spot supply has had to be either compensated by additional 
speculative demand, or producers had to cut down their supply. Additional 
speculative demand should then have shown up in rising inventories. 
Second, the futures- and the spot market should have been in a contango, a 
market situation where the futures prices were higher than the spot prices 
(http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com).  
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Table 5 summarizes the relationships between futures and spot prices during 
the 2007 – 2008 bull markets. During more then 50 percent of the days, 
futures prices were higher than spot prices. Within the crude oil bull market, 
the market was in roughly 64 percent of the days in a contango, during the 
gold bull market in around 68 percent of the days. The most striking result 
was obtained for corn, where during 2007 and 2008 the market was in a 
“pure” contango, with futures prices on average 33,3 US cents per bushel 
higher than spot prices. 
The result for corn stands in clear contrast to the one obtained for wheat, 
which is not included in the table as the wheat market was mostly in 
backwardation.  
Looking at the results of this examination, however, the question arises, 
whether the number of days in contango or the average price difference 
between futures- and spot prices really have any explanatory value. It is not 
clear, which price spread would be necessary in order to attract speculators? 
Data on storage costs would be required. Also, what if the accumulation of 
inventories was conducted underground? It could be possible that producers 
reduced their supply just by the amount necessary for the spot market to 
clear. If one assumes a small price elasticity of demand, then the excess spot 
supply could have been small enough that the reduction of supply is not easily 
detected in official data. OPEC supply of crude oil for example slightly 
decreased over the past years.    
Another ambiguity is conveyed by the question which futures contracts were 
used as the benchmarks for spot prices. Within the analysis, the prices of the 
nearest contracts to expire were used. During such strong bull markets, 
however, it is not clear whether it was the contract closest to expire, which 
was used as a benchmark.  
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The first argument stated that if it had been speculation that had driven up 
prices, then this should have shown up in rising inventories. 
However, the question is whether rising inventories really should have been 
an indispensable consequence of speculation.  
It is realistic to assume that the short- term price elasticity of several 
commodities was very low, especially the one for crude oil and food 
(UNCTAD 2009). If no close substitutes were quickly available, consumers of 
those commodities had no other choice than to simply cope with price 
increases. 
Therefore firms still kept up the same demand but shifted the rising production 
costs to consumers by increasing prices. US inflation rose from 2,08 percent 
in January 2007 to 5,6 percent in July 2008, according to the US Bureau of 
Labour Statistics. Spot demand did not decline accordingly and no 
accumulation of inventories happened. Data on commodity inventories are 
also not entirely reliable but rather incomplete. As inventories have often not 
been reported, a significant part is not included in official data. Additionally a 
large number of countries entailed trade restrictions on several commodities. 
Due to the resulting tight market conditions, consumers who wanted to 
accumulate inventories were not able to do so, however, the attempt could 
have done to push prices further up.   
Whether the absence of observable increases in commodity inventories is an 
indicator that speculation did not cause the enormous price hikes is 
questionable, due to above- mentioned arguments. 
 
No. Of days in 
contango
No. Of days in 
backwardation
Average price 
difference during 
contango
Crude Oil Futures2.2.2007 - 3.7.2008 236 134
2,55 US dollars 
per barrel
Corn Futures 2.8.2007 - 2.7.2008 240 0
33,3 US cents per 
barrel
Gold Futures 17.8.2007 - 18.3.2008 104 49
3,56 US dollars 
per troy ounce
Copper Futures 31.1.2007 - 4.5.2007 38 30
4,22 US cents per 
pound
Data Source: Thompson Datastream
Table 5: Contango and Backwardation in Commodity Futures Markets
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3.6 Assumptions of Equilibrium Commodity Price Models  
 
3.6.1. Normal Distribution and Independent Prices over Time  
 
The probability theory underlying the economic analysis of commodity price 
dynamics very often describes commodity prices to be normally distributed.  
The properties of the normal distribution are a consequence of the central limit 
theorem, which states that a sufficiently large number of random variables are 
approximately normally distributed, if they are independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) with a finite variance and mean. 
The assumption that prices are i.i.d. distributed can be found in a large 
number of papers dealing with commodity price dynamics, especially 
equilibrium (structural) models. 
As the independence of (daily) prices also constitutes a crucial assumption for 
prices to follow a random walk, it is worth the time to take a closer look at it, 
especially against the background of recent year’s dynamics. 
As it usually constitutes one of the basic assumptions of equilibrium 
approaches, it is worth the time to take a closer look at it, especially against 
the background of recent years’ dynamics. 
 
If a number of random variables are independent and identically distributed, 
then the outcome of one variable does not depend on the outcome of any 
other variable, formally P(X = x
i
,Y = y
i
) = P(X = x
i
) !P(Y = y
i
) . 
In our case this means that each daily price is generated by independent 
events, and so today’s price does not influence tomorrow’s price. Prices are 
independent over time.   
The logic behind the assumption of commodity prices being independent over 
time derives from the EMH, as formulated by Eugene Fama (1970).  
It states that price changes are normally distributed random variables, as they 
occur due to the random emergence of new information on fundamental 
values of commodities.  
Obviously this reasoning stands in clear contrast to the hypothesis formulated 
at the beginning of this chapter. It is hard to believe that commodity prices are 
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independent over time. According to my interpretation of the commodity price 
dynamics after 2003 using trend following trading techniques speculation 
exerted a significant influence on prices by elongating upward (downward) 
runs.  
The EMH dismisses this argument stating that investors are fully rational and 
therefore prices will stay in line with their fundamental values. 
However, it is the irrationality of market participants that causes the 
dependence of prices over time. 
Investment techniques (such as technical analysis) used by commodity 
speculators try to exploit the persistence of price runs (the temporal 
dependence of prices). It even seems natural to believe that a strong upward 
run, fundamental changes ceteris paribus, will continue to persist up to a 
certain degree. By betting on the persistence of a short- term trend, 
speculators prolong it at the same time.  The profitability of these trading 
rules, on which can be deduced by looking at the increasing volume of capital 
channelled into commodity futures, strengthens this self-reinforcing process.  
In order to test these propositions, the author has analysed the distribution of 
daily spot prices of wheat, corn, crude oil, copper and gold. 
 
Figure 17: Distribution of Daily Wheat Prices 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
Figure 17 to 21 show the distribution of commodity spot prices over the whole 
data sample. All graphs include a Kernel Density estimation as well as a 
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normal overlay, to see what a normally distributed variable should look like. 
Kernel density graphs (which estimate the probability density function of each 
variable) have been chosen over a histogram due to their smoother 
appearance.  
 
Figure 18: Distribution of Daily Corn Prices 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
At first glance not a single variable appears normally distributed.  
A normal distribution exhibits a theoretical value of zero for the skew and a 
value of three for the kurtosis. If commodity prices have deviated from a 
normal distribution it therefore can be noted from these values.  
A kurtosis that exceeds the theoretical value of three can be interpreted as a 
sign for fat tails, meaning that the density at the edges exceeds the 
boundaries of a normal distribution. As can be seen from the kernel density 
estimates in the graphs, boundaries were exceeded for all five commodities, 
most notably for copper spot prices.  
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Figure 19:  Distribution of Daily Crude Oil Prices 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
Prices exhibited heavy fat tail distributions to the right hand side. This means 
that for each commodity a considerable amount of daily prices exceeded the 
mean by far, which is not too surprising if one bears in mind the spectacular 
price increases over the last years. 
 
Figure 20: Distribution of Daily Copper Prices 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
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Figure 21: Distribution of Daily Gold Prices 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
Additionally to the heavy right fat tails, also the density in the centre of the 
distribution exceeded the boundaries of a normal distribution, whereas values 
slightly higher than the mean were less often observed.  
Remarkably, the density functions at the fat right tails were larger than in 
regions with more modest positive price deviations from the mean, again very 
pronounced for copper. This indicates that over the sample period price 
increases exceeding the mean occurred to a large degree in regions with 
extremely high variances. If these price increases were really caused by 
fundamental changes, these would have had to be remarkably strong.  
To back up these observations table 6 summarizes the values for the mean, 
standard deviation, skew, kurtosis and results for the Jarque Bera test for the 
five commodities. The latter was used to test whether prices were normally 
distributed. The Jarque Bera test statistic is defined as: 
JB =
n
6
! (s
2
+ (
(k " 3)
2
4
)   
with s  denoting the skew and k  denoting the kurtosis of the distribution. 
Under the null hypothesis that the variable is normally distributed, the JB 
statistic is asymptotically Chi Squared distributed, with two degrees of 
freedom.  
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All commodities exhibited an excess kurtosis, proving the observation that 
price distributions have fat tails. If one takes the values of the mean and 
standard deviation and looks at the graphs again, it becomes very obvious 
that the density in the medium range above the mean was very low in all five 
cases. Price deviations upwards from the mean therefore occurred more often 
in very high price regions. E.g. the density of price deviations from the mean 
of daily copper spot prices was higher for the region between 300 and 400 US 
cents per pound, than the density for values between 200 and 300 US cents 
per pound, with a copper spot price mean of 134,11 US cents per pound.   
Finally, the null hypothesis of the Jarque Bera- Test that prices were normally 
distributed can clearly be rejected in all cases.  
Over the sample period 1989 to the end of 2008, spot prices for wheat, corn, 
crude oil, copper and gold were not normally distributed. The findings of this 
chapter clearly rule out that commodity prices actually followed a random walk 
without drift (often assumed by the EMH) as prices have not been 
independent over time. Additionally the price correlations over time raise 
doubt about the well functioning of arbitrage, as proposed by the EMH.  
 
In a next step, the sample will be divided into two periods, namely the 1990’s 
and the target period of the hypothesis, 2003 – 2008. 
Splitting up the entire sample shall serve the purpose to analyse whether 
prices followed different distributions, one with a small variance over the 
1990’s and one with a large variance after 2003. The assumption behind this 
procedure is that commodity prices might be approximated by two different 
distributions, one for “ordinary” times and one for times characterized by 
Mean Std.Deviation Skew Kurtosis JB test Probability
Wheat 422,59 153,45 2,369 10,049 15297 0
Corn 254,34 82,85 2,191 8,598 10716 0
Crude Oil 33,65 23,68 2,036 7,157 7180 0
Copper 134,11 84,69 1,827 5,134 3798 0
Gold 407,9 151,27 1,948 6,293 5519 0
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
Table 6: Summary Statistics of Spot Prices between 1990 - 2009
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financial turbulences (Streißler 2009). As I stated in my hypothesis, investors 
were looking for new investment opportunities at the beginning of the 21st 
century. Capital was channelled into commodity futures markets. After the 
outbreak of the financial crisis had become apparent in mid 2007, dynamics in 
commodity markets tightened even more, ending with the price crash over the 
second half of 2008. Financial developments after 2003 therefore have greatly 
influenced the behaviour of commodity prices.  
 
Figure 22: Distribution of Daily Crude Oil Prices before 2003 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
However, I still do not expect prices over the 90’s to be approximated by a 
normal distribution. 
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Figure 23: Distribution of Daily Crude Oil Prices after 2003 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
Again the graphs show that prices were not normally distributed, neither 
during the first, nor during the second period. 
However, over the 1990’s the kernel density estimation did not differ as 
obviously from the normal overlay as over the posterior period.  
Crude oil prices over the 90’s could have followed a leptokurtic distribution, as 
the excess kurtosis in the centre (the crown above the peak of the Gaussian 
bell) is most pronounced, while the fat tail is less.  
 
Figure 24: Distribution of Daily Wheat Prices before 2003 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
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The latter, which were observed clearly in the whole sample, are also 
considerably less pronounced for wheat prices between the years 1990 and 
2000. After 2003 they are again more visible. Density in the region with prices 
slightly above the mean was notably higher during the 90’s, while the density 
of the middle range is quite small again after 2003.  
 
Figure 25: Distribution of Daily Wheat Prices after 2003 
 
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
 
The null hypothesis of the Jarque Bera test again can be rejected again. 
During both periods prices were not normally distributed. For four out of five 
commodities, the kurtosis was even higher during the 1990’s. 
 
 
The most notable difference, however, was the significantly increased 
standard deviations between 2003 and 2008. Compared to the 90’s, standard 
deviations increased at least by 200%. During the latter period commodity 
Mean Std.Deviation Skew Kurtosis JB test Probability
Wheat 378,4 86,85 1,04 4,41 697 0
Corn 251,4 59,69 2,12 8,59 5365 0
Crude Oil 19,7 3,96 1,18 7,05 2396 0
Copper 100,8 20,42 0,02 2,1 88,21 0
Gold 351 39,48 -0,71 2,45 251 0
Table 7: Summary Statistics of Spot Prices between 1990 - 2000  
Data Source: Thompson Datastream 
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prices were a lot more volatile, with considerably higher deviations of daily 
prices from the mean.  
 
 
 
3.6.2. Inter-Correlations and Index Speculation 
 
In addition to price dependence over time, prices of different commodities 
were inter-correlated between 2003 and 2009.  
To a certain extent, assuming the mutual independence of different 
commodity prices would be more intuitive than the independence of prices 
over time. One would hardly think that daily prices of crude oil futures are 
influenced by the dynamics of corn prices.  
However, by investing in commodity indices, speculation also led to significant 
inter-correlations between the prices of different commodities. Rather than 
analysing individual market conditions, many institutional investors (hedge 
funds, pension funds etc.) distributed their capital among key commodities. 
With a large amount of additional speculative capital channelled into 
commodity indices between 2003 and 2008, the prices of several 
commodities increased jointly. 
To see whether this last proposition that commodity prices are mutually 
dependent is valid, correlations between the different commodities were 
constructed. Again, according to the line of arguments, the whole sample was 
divided into two sub samples, the 1990’s and the period 2003 until the end of 
2008. The results of the correlations are presented in table 9 and 10. 
 
Mean Std.Deviation Skew Kurtosis JB test Probability
Wheat 538 204,79 1,51 4,61 771 0
Corn 289 114,93 1,35 4,28 587 0
Crude Oil 61 25,69 1 3,67 292 0
Copper 220 107,58 0,17 1,48 157 0
Gold 565 184,16 0,6 2,13 143 0
Table 8: Summary Statistics of Spot Prices between 2003 - 2009
Data Source: Thompson Datastream
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Table 9, covering the period from 1990 to the end of the past century exhibits 
the correlation results one would expect for such diverse commodities. The 
only notably high correlations were between wheat and corn and between 
gold and copper, although to a much lesser extent. 
Both wheat and corn share some of the most important producers, such as 
the United States or Canada. If one or more of these countries are affected by 
disadvantageous weather conditions, such as a severe drought, both 
commodities yields will be affected. Price movements into similar directions 
are therefore not too surprising.  
Other correlations, for example between wheat and crude oil or corn and 
copper were clearly insignificant, with values of 0,008 and 0,26 respectively. 
 
After 2003, however, correlations changed significantly and several pairs of 
commodities showed unexpected results. 
The correlation between crude oil and wheat increased from 0,008 over the 
first period to a value of 0,83 after 2003.  
Wheat Corn Crude Oil Copper Gold
Wheat 1
Corn 0,8 1
Crude Oil 0,008 0,06 1
Copper 0,44 0,26 0,37 1
Gold 0,51 0,46 0,29 0,68 1
Table 9: Correlations between Spot Prices over 1990 - 2000
Data Source: Thompson Datastream
Wheat Corn Crude Oil Copper Gold
Wheat 1
Corn 0,84 1
Crude Oil 0,83 0,76 1
Copper 0,75 0,63 0,84 1
Gold 0,9 0,82 0,88 0,85 1
Data Source: Thompson Datastream
Table 10: Correlations between Spot Prices over 2003 - 2009
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Crude oil- as well as gold prices correlated with every other price during the 
latter period. This result is indeed very much a surprise, since one would not 
have expected a correlation of 0,90 between gold and wheat prices.  
The answer to the mutual dependence of daily commodity prices after 2003 is 
provided by the hypothesis formulated in this paper. Investors distributed fixed 
amounts of capital across a number of commodities, by investing in 
commodity indices, such as the Goldman Sachs or the Dow Jones-AIG index. 
By doing so, additional (speculative) demand increased significantly for all of 
the commodities included in an index. Price movements into similar directions, 
most notably of course upward movements, were the result.  
Increasing inter-correlations between different commodities could also have 
been (partly) the result of herd behaviour and uniformed trading, especially 
after the beginning collapse of the real estate market (UNCTAD 2009). 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this study was the analysis of the empirical behaviour of 
five key commodity prices in order to contribute to the discussion about the 
role of speculation in commodity price dynamics between 2003 and 2009.  
A comprehensive knowledge and understanding of commodity price dynamics 
is a necessary condition for economic and political stability. Crude oil still 
constitutes a major input factor of global industrial production and price hikes 
therefore directly affect global economic growth. The vast majority of people in 
developing countries are net food buyers and spend a large proportion of their 
income on food (Minot 2008, Ivanic and Martin 2008). The sharp price 
increases of agricultural commodities between 2007 and mid 2008 therefore 
especially hit the poorest worldwide. This fact was reflected in the 
considerable increase of the number of malnourished people worldwide over 
those 18 months. FAO estimated that compared to 2003, an additional 150 
million has had to suffer from chronic hunger in 2009 (FAO 2009).   
 
The empirical findings of this study stand in clear contrast to the predominant 
paradigm of contemporary economics of resources, the belief in the efficiency 
of commodity markets.  
Remember that in efficient commodity markets, changes in the supply of and 
the demand for a commodity cause price dynamics. Section 3.2 analysed the 
fundamental conditions in the underlying spot markets for corn, crude oil and 
wheat. Until the beginning of the 21st century it seemed plausible that the 
price dynamics of corn, crude oil and wheat were caused by shifts in 
fundamental factors. Prices increased when demand exceeded supply and 
vice versa. However, the dynamics after 2003 did not appear to be consistent 
with fundamental changes. Between 2003 and 2007 the spot price of crude oil 
more than doubled even though supply of the commodity grew faster than 
demand for the commodity. If the crude oil price over the subsequent 18 
months is compared to anterior fundamental changes and the corresponding 
price dynamics, it also seems implausible that the immense price hikes were 
caused by market fundamentals. The same conclusion was drawn after 
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analysing spot market conditions for corn and wheat. Based on the 
comparison of market fundamentals and price movements, it seemed that the 
proposition of efficient markets could not hold up against the empirical 
findings. 
The analysis of trading activities in commodity futures markets did not deliver 
any such definite results. However, this was mainly due to the non-
transparency of data on trader categories in futures markets. Only after 2006 
the CFTC provided more detailed data on commodity futures trading activities, 
a space of time too short for obtaining substantive results. 
 
Section 3.4 of the study broke down the primary bull market between 2003 
and mid 2008 into several periods of smaller length. The goal of this approach 
was the comparison of the duration and slope of upward and downward runs 
within any chosen bull market. The logic behind the EMH would have 
predicted that daily price increases during bull markets exhibited a steeper 
slope than daily price decreases. If one perceived speculation, i.e. trend 
following trading techniques to have caused the bull markets, upward runs 
should have lasted longer than downward runs during bull markets.  
The procedure yielded mixed results again. However, it rather emphasised 
the influence of speculative activity on price dynamics. Within each 
considered bull market for all five commodities upward runs indeed lasted 
longer than downward runs, however, in most cases also exhibited the greater 
slope.  
The fact that during bull markets between 2007 and mid 2008, the period 
characterized by the sharpest price hikes, upward runs lasted longer 
compared to upward runs during bull markets before 2007 added additional 
support to the speculation hypothesis. 
 
The strongest evidence for the destabilizing effects of speculation on 
commodity prices resulted from the examination of price distributions and the 
detailed correlation analysis.  
Over the whole sample period, 1990 – 2009, prices of all five commodities 
were not, as assumed by equilibrium models, normally distributed. Instead, 
excess kurtosis and heavy fat tails were observed. The same results were 
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obtained when the whole data sample was reduced to the period 2003 – 
2009. The observation of extremely high variances points to the magnitude of 
price changes that were observed in commodity markets over the past years. 
Even more important, it puts considerable pressure on the proposition of 
efficient commodity markets. The high density of prices that exceeded the 
sample mean by far could indicate a price-driving effect of speculation. Due to 
inductive behaviour, traders in commodity futures markets protracted price 
hikes without any fundamental reasons to do so. Past price increases induced 
speculators to bet on the hikes to continue. This is exactly what trend 
following trading techniques, vastly used in commodity futures markets did. 
The process was self-reinforcing since rising prices and the profitability of 
trading supported each other. 
Supporters of the EMH would immediately bring up the stabilizing effects of 
arbitrage to counter the argument of self-reinforcing price runs. However, as it 
was described in section 3.5 of the study, arbitrageurs are in an agency 
relationship with uninformed investors whose capital they need in order to 
perform their trades. Since investors lack any profound knowledge of the 
market, they allocate their capital based on past returns. So if the mispricing 
against which arbitrageurs trade worsens over time, investors will only 
observe arbitrageurs losing money and therefore will withdraw their funds 
(Shleifer 2000). Arbitrage in commodity futures market might therefore have 
been most constrained, when prices deviated the strongest from their 
fundamental equilibrium values. And even if arbitrageurs had not been subject 
to capital constraints, they still might have been forced to concern themselves 
with the mass psychology of the market, rather than with the “true value” of a 
commodity (Keynes 1936). The finding of high variances also highlights the 
crucial importance of assessing shorter time horizons in the evaluation of 
commodity markets. Structural models only acknowledge temporary price 
deviations (not caused by speculation) and assume a mean reverting effect 
over the long run. However, over the period 2003 to 2009 no such mean 
reverting effect was observed. Until the second quarter of 2008, commodity 
prices increased without converging to any long run equilibrium value. And 
even after the crashes in the second half of 2008, prices were considerably 
higher than before 2003, without fundamentals seaming to justify this level.  
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Speculators and commercial traders in commodity futures markets are 
focused on short time horizons. Comprehensive approaches to theoretically 
modelled commodity markets should acknowledge this fact. Furthermore, a 
period of more than five years, during which no mean reversion was observed 
can hardly be considered as a short time horizon.  
The fact that prices were not normally distributed after 1990 also contradicts 
the random walk without drift hypothesis. Remember, if prices had followed a 
random walk without drift, speculation based on past price observations could 
not have had yielded constant above equilibrium returns. However, the 
dependence of prices over time did leave room for the continued profitability 
of trend following trading and therefore for the destabilizing effect of 
speculation.  
In the last section of the empirical part of this study, considerably high inter-
correlations between substantially different commodities were encountered. 
Nearly identical price movements of diverse commodities after 2003 suggest 
that index speculation played a large role in price hikes. Investors in 
commodity indices allocated fixed amounts of capital across several key 
commodities, regardless of the underlying fundamental market conditions. As 
a result, large buy orders put pressure on all of these prices, even if 
fundamental factors did not change significantly.  
 
The evidence found in this study credibly supports the hypothesis that 
speculation amplified price dynamics and caused prices to overshoot their 
fundamental equilibrium values during the period 2003 – 2009. The finding of 
speculatively driven commodity prices has several important theoretical and 
empirical implications. First, it underlines the inability of equilibrium models to 
describe commodity price dynamics between 2003 and 2009. Commodity 
markets did not function in accordance with the efficient market view. It seems 
that irrational behaviour and limited arbitrage have been a general condition in 
commodity markets, at least over the recent years. The dependence of prices 
over time and inter-correlations need to be incorporated into theoretical 
models. So has to be the absence of mean reversion over a considerable long 
time period. The fact that commodity prices exhibited high variances over the 
past years challenges the convergence of prices to any long run equilibrium 
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over this period of time. To depart from sticking to the existence of long run 
equilibrium and to market efficiency is also an important task of critical 
economic science, as during periods of mispricing considerable time passes. 
Even if prices converge to their long run equilibrium at some point in time, 
until then millions of people might die of hunger and the inability to afford food.  
The growing importance of speculation in commodity futures markets also 
increases the difficulties commercial traders face. Hedging becomes more 
complex due to the presence of speculators, since price signals stemming 
from futures contracts cannot be relied on. To the extent that speculators 
caused the high variance of prices, hedging might even become unaffordable 
for commercial traders from developing countries, since they may not be able 
to afford margin calls (UNCTAD 2009). During the analysed period 2003 – 
2009, margin levels for several commodities have increased at the Chicago 
Board of Trade.  
 
The results of this study suggest that the functioning of commodity markets 
has not been in line with the efficiency view.  However, further research on the 
topic is still required in order to support the findings of this study.  
The main challenge to the analysis of commodity price dynamics remains the 
lack of comprehensive data. It has been hard for critics of the efficient market 
theorem to establish a clear link between speculation and commodity price 
hikes. Little detailed information was available on trading activities in 
commodity futures markets. Only recently has the CFTC began to collect 
disaggregated data. Also data on stocks, which constitute a major factor in the 
analysis of resources, is far from complete. Due to the lack of data, 
regressions and causality tests performed during the creation of this study 
were left out in the final version of this paper.  
Lately critics of the efficiency hypothesis have very often arrogated the 
regulation of and political intervention in commodity markets. However, it is 
crucial for the regulator to be equipped with comprehensive knowledge and 
understanding of the respective markets. The ability of commodity market 
regulation strongly depends on further collection of data on trading activities in 
futures markets. 
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Appendix A 
 
A.1. English Summary 
 
This diploma thesis analyses the empirical behaviour of commodity prices in 
the 21st century. A comprehensive reconsideration of commodity price 
dynamics is of great contemporary importance not only to evaluate the 
present state of the world economy but also for political stability, especially in 
developing countries.  
 
The purpose of this study is to elaborate whether commodity price dynamics 
can be explained without the influence of speculation in commodity futures 
markets. Within the first part of the study, two theoretical perceptions of 
financial markets are opposed, i.e. the hypothesis of efficient markets versus 
the hypothesis of inefficient markets. This procedure shall highlight possible 
shortcomings of real commodity futures markets.  
In the second part of the study, the author formulates the hypothesis that 
destabilizing speculation has considerably influenced commodity prices in the 
21st century. In order to prove this position, the behaviour of copper, corn, 
crude oil, gold and wheat prices are analysed in a general to specific 
approach.  
 
The results of the empirical analysis of key commodities prices support the 
author’s hypothesis that speculation influenced commodity prices. An analysis 
of supply and demand conditions and parallel price movements shows that 
market fundamentals did not account for the extent of price increases after 
2003. Furthermore, prices were not normally distributed after 1990, which 
rules out the proposition that price changes followed a random walk, a major 
argument of the efficiency hypothesis. Strong evidence in support of the 
author’s hypothesis results also from the dependence of prices over time and 
the considerably high inter-correlations of different commodities.  
The results of this study credibly suggest that the functioning of commodity 
markets after 2003 has not been in line with the efficiency hypothesis.  
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A.2 German Summary 
 
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit analysiert das empirische Verhalten von 
Rohstoffpreisen im 21. Jahrhundert. Eine umfassende Neubewertung dieser 
Preisdynamiken ist von größter aktueller Bedeutung, da Rohstoffe sowohl 
wichtige Einsatzfaktoren industrieller Produktion darstellen, als auch die 
politische Stabilität insbesondere in Entwicklungsländern maßgeblich 
beeinflussen. 
 
Die zentrale Frage dieser Studie ist, ob die Dynamiken von Rohstoffpreisen 
der letzten Jahre ohne den Einfluss von Spekulation in Futures Märkten 
erklärbar sind. Innerhalb des ersten Teiles dieser Arbeit werden zwei 
unterschiedliche Auffassungen von Finanzmärkten einander 
gegenübergestellt, d.h. die Markteffizienzhypothese versus die Hypothese 
ineffizienter Finanzmärkte. Diese Vorgehensweise soll etwaige Defizite realer 
Rohstoff Futures Märkte hervorheben. Im zweiten Teil dieser Studie formuliert 
der Autor die Hypothese, dass Rohstoffpreise während des 21. Jahrhunderts 
wesentlich von Spekulation beeinflusst bzw. geformt wurden. Um dies zu 
belegen wird das Preisverhalten von Kupfer, Mais, Rohöl, Gold und Weizen 
betrachtet, wobei die Analyse vom Allgemeinen ins Spezifische erfolgt. 
 
Die Resultate der empirischen Analyse von Rohstoffpreisen unterstützen die 
Hypothese des Autors. Preise wurden maßgeblich von Spekulation 
beeinflusst. Die Betrachtung von Angebots- und Nachfragebedingungen in 
Spotmärkten sowie der dazugehörigen Preise kam zu dem Ergebnis, dass 
eine ausschließliche Begründung der Preisanstiege nach 2003 durch 
fundamentale Faktoren als nicht zulässig erscheint. Die beobachteten 
Preisverteilungen führen zu einer Ablehnung der Random Walk Hypothese. 
Weitere Belege für die Spekulations- Hypothese resultieren aus der zeitlichen 
Abhängigkeit von Preisen, sowie signifikant hohen Inter-Korrelationen.   
Die vorliegende Studie zeigt deutlich, dass die Wirkungsweise von 
Rohstoffmärkten keinesfalls im Einklang mit der Markteffizienzhypothese 
steht. 
 
 81 
A.3. Curriculum Vitae 
 
Personal Information 
 
Date/Place of Birth:  12/28/1982, Salzburg 
Citizenship:   Austria 
Email:    sebastian.essl[at]gmail.com 
 
Education 
 
10/2004 – present Economics  
University of Vienna, Austria 
10/2003 – present Political Science, Bachelor of Arts with Distinction  
   University of Vienna, Austria 
10/2006 – 2/2007 Erasmus Mobility Programme 
   University Carlos III Madrid, Spain  
2/2003 – 6/2003 Spanish  
   University of Malaga, Spain 
9/1993 – 6/2001 High School, Graduation with Distinction 
   Musisches Gymnasium Salzburg, Austria 
 
Work Experience 
 
Summer 2008 Intern 
UNIDO field office Mexico City, Mexico 
Summer 2007 Trainee 
   Austrian Trade Commission Buenos Aires, Argentina 
Summer 2006 Trainee 
First Ask Programme and Reach Out Mbuya Kampala, 
Uganda 
   
